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INTRODUCTION 
Cramdown1 is messy. It pits a chapter 11 debtor’s stakeholders against each 
other, in a match in which the main issue is the value of what each is to receive 
under a plan of reorganization. Because cramdown is nonconsensual, any 
judicial decision involving cramdown must reconcile deeply-held and diverse 
views as to the value being offered. 
Valuation in bankruptcy, in turn, is also messy. Courts are often placed in 
the position of assigning a monetary value to an asset for which there is either 
no seller or no buyer, and often no market. To complicate matters, these assets 
are often nothing more than intangible promises of a reorganized debtor; 
 
 1 By “cramdown,” I mean the nonconsensual confirmation of a chapter 11 plan of reorganization 
achieved under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). I thus use it as a noun. In contrast, I use the two words “cram down” as a 
verb to describe the action or process of implementing a cramdown. As I have noted before, albeit in a 
different context: 
Courts use “cramdown” and “cram down” and “cram-down” interchangeably. Indeed, Justice 
Douglas once combined different forms in the same paragraph. Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. 
Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 167 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The hyphenated version appears to 
have been the first locution used by a court. New Eng. Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R.R. Co., 143 
F.2d 179, 189 n.36 (2d Cir. 1944).  
The earliest print references to the term use either the two-word or the hyphenated form. Compare 
Robert T. Swaine, Present Status of Railroad Reorganizations Legislation Affecting Them, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION ON COMM. LAW 15, 15 (1940) (two-word form) and 
Warner Fuller, The Background and Techniques of Equity and Bankruptcy Railroad 
Reorganizations—A Survey, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 389, 390 (1940) (hyphenated form). 
In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 858 n.7 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (Markell, J.). 
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promises from an entity that has already broken most of its past promises to its 
creditors.  
Outside of bankruptcy, such promises are routinely valued in the world of 
finance. In many cases, markets exist in which such promises are traded. Bond 
markets, for example, exist to trade the promises of bond issuers to pay sums 
borrowed. Value in these markets is the prices traders are willing to acquire or 
release these promises. 
In bankruptcy reorganization, plan proponents often craft plans of 
reorganization that compel creditors to trade a promise made before 
bankruptcy for a promise forged under the plan. The terms may be quite 
different. Short-term construction loans can transform into medium- and long-
term investments; obligations may become collateralized (and vice versa); and 
debt instruments may morph into equity interests. 
In many cases, these transformations are consensual. Section 1129(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) provides the plan proponent2 with the ability to 
confirm a plan by persuading classes of stakeholders to vote to adopt the plan. 
The plan proponent need not convince every creditor or stakeholder; 
§ 1129(a)(8) requires only unanimity of class acceptance, not unanimity of 
creditor acceptance.3 As a result, if a plan proponent can obtain the positive 
votes of more than one-half of those creditors voting in a class, and those 
creditors hold at least two-thirds of the debt voting in that class, the class 
accepts.4 Outvoted creditors in any class, so long as they will receive at least as 
much in reorganization as they would have in a liquidation,5 must accept the 
plan’s treatment, as plan confirmation will discharge their claims in excess of 
what they receive under the confirmed plan.6 
This voting process, however, is not cramdown as it is classically 
understood. Cramdown in the historic sense consists of confirmation over the 
dissent of an entire class.7 To engage in over-generalization, the Code permits 
such confirmation only if the dissenting class receives payment in full (but not 
 
 2 I use the term “plan proponent” instead of debtor or debtor in possession, as any party in interest can, 
after the expiration of the exclusivity period, propose a plan of reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2012). 
 3 Id. § 1129(a)(8). 
 4 Id. § 1126(c). 
 5 This requirement flows from § 1129(a)(7), the so-called “best interest of creditors” test. 
 6 11 U.S.C. § 1141. 
 7 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 
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more than in full), or if no class junior in priority receives anything.8 The deck 
is stacked in favor of plan proponents, however, because “payment in full” 
does not have to be payment in cash. It can consist of any sort of “property,” 
including the types of intangible promises that banks, investors, and markets 
value on a daily basis.9 
Whether this daily experience can precisely be transferred to cramdown has 
vexed many. This Article looks not at the policies behind cramdown—that is 
for another time and place. Instead, this Article looks at the history and 
legislative policies behind the current state of cramdown, as well as recent 
attempts to value the promises of a reorganizing debtor. Along the way, it 
examines Till v. SCS Corp.,10 a 2004 Supreme Court case of major contention 
in this area, and Till’s recent application in the cramdown confirmation in 
Momentive Performance Materials Inc. (“Momentive”),11 a large, public-
company chapter 11 case.12 
This examination reveals a gap between (1) the purposes and policies of 
cramdown as historically understood, and the current contentions; and (2) 
expectations of hedge funds and other financial players that cramdown rates 
should be determined by the market—the rates an actual lender would accept 
in extending credit to the reorganized debtor. Given the history and precedents 
in the cramdown area, this Article takes the position that Momentive was 
correct, and that courts should resist using such market-based discount rates in 
cramdown calculations. 
I. THE CONCEPT AND EXCHANGE ANTICIPATED BY § 1129(B)(1) 
Section 1129 of the Code governs confirmation of chapter 11 plans of 
reorganization. Section 1129(a) sets forth sixteen requirements for 
 
 8 See id. ¶ 1129.03[4][a][ii]. 
 9 See id. ¶ 1129.03[4][a][i][A],[C]. 
 10 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
 11 Momentive was an affiliate of the lead debtor, MPM Silicones, LLC. As a consequence, the case is 
reported under the name of the affiliate. See In re MPM Silicones, LLC (Momentive), No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 
WL 4436335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-
1771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015).  
 12 Momentive was not the first case to adopt Till in chapter 11, but it well may be the most notorious, 
given the billions of dollars at issue. See In re Pamplico Highway Dev., LLC, 468 B.R. 783, 795 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 2012) (collecting cases); In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 460 B.R. 38, 55 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2011) (collecting cases); see also Gary W. Marsh & Matthew M. Weiss, Chapter 11 Interest Rates After Till, 
84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 209, 221 (2010) (“Till’s formula approach, which adds the prime rate to a debtor–specific 
risk adjustment, should now be considered the default interest rate for a Chapter 11 cramdown.”). 
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confirmation,13 including the consent of each class of creditors or interest 
holders under the plan. Confirmation of a plan without the consent of all 
classes is possible, but heavily circumscribed. Section 1129(b)(1) sets forth the 
requirements. While paragraph (1) relaxes the requirement of unanimous class 
consent, all other requirements of § 1129(a) remain in place.14 Thus, to cram 
down a nonconsensual plan, the plan proponent must, among other things, still 
propose the plan in good faith;15 still pay each impaired creditor at least as 
much as it would receive in a liquidation;16 still pay all administrative claims in 
full;17 and still establish that the plan is economically feasible.18 
In addition, § 1129(b)(1) requires the plan proponent to show that the plan 
does not discriminate unfairly against the dissenting class, and is fair and 
equitable as to that class.19 Unfair discrimination is a horizontal equity test; it 
ensures that a plan does not unduly favor a class having similar priority to the 
dissenting class simply because the favored class voted for the plan, and the 
dissenting class did not.20 Although valuation issues can and do arise in the 
unfair discrimination analysis, those issues are for another time. 
This Article focuses on the vertical equity test of § 1129(b)(1): whether a 
plan is “fair and equitable” as to the dissenting class. That is, it examines how 
the concept of “fair and equitable” polices the distribution of reorganization 
value among stakeholders with different nonbankruptcy priorities. 
A. The History of “Fair and Equitable” 
Undoubtedly, “fair and equitable” is not a crisp, well-defined standard. An 
examination of its provenance demonstrates, however, that this vagueness was 
intentional from the beginning. While the statutory origins of the phrase lie in 
 
 13 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)–(16) (2012). In individual chapter 11 cases, there is a seventeenth, uncodified 
requirement regarding the provision of current tax returns. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, 
¶ 1129.02[17]. 
 14 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). 
 15 Id. § 1129(a)(3). 
 16 Id. § 1129(a)(7). 
 17 Id. § 1129(a)(9). 
 18 Id. § 1129(a)(11). 
 19 Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
 20 I have explored this relationship elsewhere, see Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair 
Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 (1998). This article was the subject of an interchange 
between the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and myself. See Steven M. Abramowitz et al., 
Making the Test for Unfair Discrimination More “Fair”: A Proposal, 58 BUS. LAW. 83 (2002); Bruce A. 
Markell, Slouching Toward Fairness: A Reply to the ABCNY’s Proposal on Unfair Discrimination, 58 BUS. 
LAW. 109 (2002). 
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the 1933 and 1934 additions of §§ 7721 and 77B22 to the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898,23 the genesis of the phrase lies in early equity receiverships. 
1. The Statutory Origins: §§ 77 and 77B 
Sections 77 and 77B each required judicial findings as to the fairness of 
any reorganization. Section 77, as originally enacted in 1933, did not, however, 
use the words “fair and equitable.”24 Rather, it simply stated that the plan had 
to be “equitable.”25 It was not until 1935, after the adoption of § 77B, that the 
words “fair and” were inserted before “equitable” in both sections.26 
The first indication that statutory reorganization law would mirror prior 
receivership practice came early. In 1936 the Supreme Court decided In re 620 
Church Street Building Corp.27 In that case, the Court held that a 
reorganization plan, which dealt with multiple secured creditors secured by the 
same collateral, could eliminate the junior secured creditors’ property interests 
if the common collateral’s value was insufficient to pay the senior creditor’s 
debt in full.28 As the Court stated, allocation of all the collateral’s value to a 
senior lienholder extinguished “whatever interest petitioners may have [had] as 
junior lienors under the Illinois law” if the senior lien holder’s debt was not 
fully discharged.29 
Other questions over the meaning of “fair and equitable” quickly made 
their way to the Court. In 1939, in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 
the Court construed § 77B’s use of “fair and equitable.”30 The Court held that 
“[t]he words ‘fair and equitable’ . . . are words of art which prior to the advent 
of s 77B had acquired a fixed meaning through judicial interpretations in the 
field of equity receivership reorganizations.”31 
 
 21 Section 77 provided for relief for railroad corporations. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 77, 47 Stat. 
1467, 1474–82 (1933). 
 22 Section 77B, enacted a year after § 77, extended the reorganization provisions of § 77 to other types of 
corporations. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 914 (1934). 
 23 Pub. L. No. 55-171, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
 24 See § 77(g), 47 Stat. at 1479.  
 25 Id.  
 26 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 774, § 77(e)(1), 49 Stat. 911, 918 (1935). 
 27 299 U.S. 24 (1936). 
 28 Id. at 27.  
 29 Id.  
 30 308 U.S. 106 (1939). 
 31 Id. at 115.  
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2. Incorporation of Prior Equity Receivership Practice 
What was Justice Douglas’s “fixed meaning”? Adhering “to the familiar 
rule that where words are employed in an act which had at the time a well 
known meaning in the law,”32 he explained it as follows: 
If the value of the [debtor] justified the issuance of stock in exchange 
for old shares, the creditors were entitled to the benefit of that value, 
whether it was present or prospective, for dividends or only for 
purposes of control. In either event it was a right of property out of 
which the creditors were entitled to be paid before the stockholders 
could retain it for any purpose whatever.33 
In short, secured creditors were to be paid from their collateral before 
unsecured creditors share in collateral proceeds, and all creditors, secured or 
unsecured, were to be paid in full before any equity holder receives anything. 
The Supreme Court, in a series of cases in the early 1940s,34 quickly 
confirmed that Case’s interpretation of “fair and equitable” governed § 77 
railroad reorganization cases35 and chapter X36 reorganizations. 
These cases dealt primarily with the vertical adjustment of rights between 
creditors and equity owners. Questions soon arose about the proper treatment 
when the debtor was insolvent, and the issue was division of value among 
creditor groups with different priorities. Did absolute priority apply among 
creditor classes? The Court answered yes. 
3. “Fair Equivalents” of Value Under the Statute 
After In re 620 Church Street and Case, the Court continued to confirm the 
primacy of nonbankruptcy priorities, but also acknowledged the practicalities 
of reorganization. In Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, 
St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, the Court reviewed a plan’s allocation of value 
 
 32 Id.  
 33 Id. at 116 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1912)); see also Kan. City Terminal 
Ry. v. Cent. Union Tr. Co., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926) (“Unsecured creditors of insolvent corporations are 
entitled to the benefit of the values which remain after lienholders are satisfied, whether this is present or 
prospective, for dividends or only for purposes of control.”). 
 34 See Grp. Of Inst. Inv’rs v. Chi., Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); Marine 
Harbor Props., Inc. v. Mfr.’s Tr. Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942); Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 
(1941). 
 35 See Grp. Of Inst. Inv’rs, 318 U.S. at 542. 
 36 See Marine Harbor Props., 317 U.S. at 85.  
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among creditors.37 The Court stated that, among classes of creditors, absolute 
priority was satisfied if “each security holder in the order of his priority 
receives from that which is available for the satisfaction of his claim the 
equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered.”38 
This statement requires some explanation. Payment in full in reorganization 
is not necessarily payment in cash. As Case recognized, it was  
clear that [the absolute priority] rule did not “require the impossible, 
and make it necessary to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a 
condition of stockholders retaining an interest in the reorganized 
company. His interest can be preserved by the issuance, on equitable 
terms, of income bonds or preferred stock.”39 
In this light, the “equitable equivalent” of Group of Institutional Investors can 
be understood to require the valuation of what a plan proposed to exchange for 
the old, soon–to–be–discharged debt. But equitable equivalence is a slippery 
concept. It lacks mathematical certainty and admits of a wide range of possible 
satisfying answers. 
The Court acknowledged this fuzziness, but took it as part of the system. 
This can be seen from the Court’s 1943 embrace of the woolliness of the 
concept in Group of Institutional Investors.40 Speaking through Justice Douglas 
again, the Court had this to say: 
And in discussing the method by which creditors should receive “full 
compensatory treatment” for their rights, we emphasized, as already 
noted, that “Practical adjustments, rather than a rigid formula, are 
necessary.” . . . Certainly those standards do not suggest any 
mathematical formula. We recently stated in another connection that, 
whatever may be “the pretenses of exactitude” in determining a dollar 
valuation for a railroad property, “to claim for it ‘scientific’ validity, 
is to employ the term in its loosest sense.” . . . That is equally true 
here. A requirement that dollar values be placed on what each 
security holder surrenders and on what he receives would create an 
 
 37 318 U.S. at 558. The owners had been already excluded through a lack of sufficient reorganization 
value. See id. at 542 (noting the Seventh Circuit’s holding in In re Chi., Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pac. R.R., 
124 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1941), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Grp. of Inst. Inv’rs, v. Chi., Milwaukee, 
Saint Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943)). 
 38 Id. at 565 (emphasis added). 
 39 Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117 (1939) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 
482, 508 (1912)). 
 40 318 U.S. at 564. 
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illusion of certainty where none exists and would place an 
impracticable burden on the whole reorganization process.41 
So what is to be used? Earlier cases indicated that courts must take into 
account all aspects of a debtor’s business: 
Since its application requires a prediction as to what will occur in the 
future, an estimate, as distinguished from mathematical certitude, is 
all that can be made. But that estimate must be based on an informed 
judgment which embraces all facts relevant to future earning capacity 
and hence to present worth, including, of course, the nature and 
condition of the properties, the past earnings record, and all 
circumstances which indicate whether or not that record is a reliable 
criterion of future performance.42 
In short, the Court required a facts and circumstances inquiry, based around 
the reorganized debtor’s future earning capacity. The reluctance to use 
information from the market was deliberate: “The criterion of earning capacity 
is the essential one if the enterprise is to be freed from the heavy hand of past 
errors, miscalculations or disaster, and if the allocation of securities among the 
various claimants is to be fair and equitable.”43 
Justice Douglas then worked the foundational concept of earning capacity 
into an equitable equivalence test: 
It is sufficient that each security holder in the order of his priority 
receives from that which is available for the satisfaction of his claim 
the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered. That requires a 
comparison of the new securities allotted to him with the old 
securities which he exchanges to determine whether the new are the 
equitable equivalent of the old. But that determination cannot be 
made by the use of any mathematical formula.44 
So we look at the “equitable equivalent,” a determination that “the use of any 
mathematical formula” cannot make.  
 
 41 Id. at 565. 
 42 Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941). 
 43 Id. This discount can be significant. At least one recent study suggests undervaluation in bankruptcy, 
due, in part, to just the debtor’s status as having commenced a case, to be as much as 12%–20%. Michael T. 
Roberts, The Bankruptcy Discount: Profiting at the Expense of others In Chapter 11, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 157, 187 (2013). 
 44 Grp. of Inst. Inv’rs, 318 U.S. at 565–66 (emphasis added). 
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4. The 1978 Code 
A fair question is whether these Supreme Court holdings retain any current 
vitality. After all, they were made under a prior statute and referred to 
valuation methodologies that most would consider quaint today. An 
examination of the history and drafting of current § 1129(b), however, 
illustrates that these cases retain their relevance. 
The history of § 1129(b) is a history of compromise. One of the largest 
compromises was the relaxation of absolute priority as an individual creditor 
right, re-characterizing it instead as a class right only (and thus allowing a 
majority of creditors to waive the benefit of the rule over the dissent of a 
minority).45 
Other issues remained, such as whether to replace or rework the “fair and 
equitable” standard found in the Act. The Bankruptcy Review Commission, 
formed in 1968, knew of the squishiness of the “fair and equitable” standard. 
This can be seen from the Commission’s report, which stated that “[a]lthough 
market values, liquidation values, and past earnings records may be relevant, 
they are not determinative.”46 The report justified this statement by quoting 
from Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois: “‘[A]n estimate, as 
distinguished from mathematical certitude, is all that can be made.’”47 Against 
this background, the report made no new suggestions; it merely acknowledged 
the problems this lack of precision caused: “‘Inequities are inevitable’ and any 
conception about ‘clear-cut rules about legal priorities is an unrealistic one.’”48 
H.R. 6, the first bankruptcy bill introduced after the compromise on 
absolute priority referred to above, essentially opted for simple retention.49 It 
 
 45 See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 69, 88–90 (1991). 
 46 EXEC. DIR., COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. II, at 256 (1973). 
 47 Id. at 257 (quoting Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941)). 
 48 Id. (quoting Hubert L. Will, Railroad Reorganization—The Long and The Short of It, 41 ILL. L. REV. 
608, 626 (1947)). 
 49 As initially introduced on January 4, 1977, § 1129(b) of H.R. 6 read as follows: 
(b) If all of the requirements of subsection (a) of this section other than paragraph (8) are met 
with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the proponent of such plan, shall confirm such plan 
notwithstanding such paragraph if such plan is fair and equitable with respect to all classes except 
any class that has accepted the plan and that is comprised of claims or interests on account of 
which the holders of such claims or interests will receive or retain under the plan not more than 
would be so received or retained under a plan that is fair and equitable with respect to all classes. 
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contained a simple statement of the confirmation standard: a court would 
confirm a plan “if such plan were fair and equitable with respect to all classes 
except any class that has accepted the plan.”50 
Two and one-half months later, the House amended the bill to eliminate the 
simple injunction that the plan be “fair and equitable.” In its stead, the 
amended bill attempted to define fair and equitable treatment, but without 
using the words “fair and equitable.”51 Successive bills added to the statement 
of the rule.52 The House Report on the final bill reflected these changes, but 
categorized them as a “partial codification” of the absolute priority rule.53 
After some procedural wrangling with the Senate, the House’s version of 
the bankruptcy bill prevailed.54 But the bill that emerged from the negotiations 
between the House and Senate contained a drastically different treatment of 
nonconsensual reorganizations. Whereas the House bill described in the House 
Report contained only one subsection on nonconsensual confirmation that did 
not use the words “fair and equitable,”55 the new bill included two subsections 
on the topic, and explicitly incorporated the phrase “fair and equitable.”56 
The first subsection harkened back to H.R. 6 by providing that a court 
could cram down a non-consensual plan over the dissent of any class only if 
 
H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (Jan. 4, 1977). 
 50 Id. 
 51 H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (Mar. 21, 1977). This bill was the first to create different categories of 
fair and equitable treatment for different types of claims.  
 52 See H.R. 7330, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (May 23, 1977); see also H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (July 
11, 1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (Sept. 8, 1977).  
 53 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 414 (Sept. 8, 1977). The report also confirmed the rule’s focus on returning 
only the reorganization value to creditors. It stated that “creditors are entitled to be paid according to the 
going-concern value of the business.” Id. at 223. 
 54 The Senate attempted to substitute a bill sponsored by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
place of the House bill. See S. 2266, 95th Cong. (Oct. 29, 1977). This bill proposed preserving a two-track 
reorganization system and required a mandatory trustee for debtors whose equity interests were publicly held. 
Id. § 1130. Under this substitute bill, private companies would have been exempt from the fair and equitable 
rule. Id. § 1130. 
 55 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (Sept. 8, 1977). 
 56 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b), as reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. 32,350, 32,376 (1978) (enacted). 
Due to these changes, the statements on absolute priority contained in H.R. Rep. No. 595 are not as 
authoritative as they might otherwise be. Congress recognized this issue, and in lieu of a Conference Report, 
members of Congress read virtually identical statements into both the House and Senate records on the bill. 
124 CONG. REC. at 32,391 (statement of Rep. Rousselot). As noted at the time, Congress believed that this 
procedure imbued such remarks with “the effect of being a conference report.” Id. The Supreme Court has 
concurred. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 64 n.5 (1990) (“Because of the absence of a conference and the key 
roles played by Representative Edwards and his counterpart floor manager Senator DeConcini, we have treated 
their floor statements on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as persuasive evidence of congressional intent.”). 
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the plan were, among other things, “fair and equitable.”57 Although the bill 
continued past practice and did not attempt to define this concept explicitly, 
Congress’s prior efforts to define it were not lost. The second subsection on 
cramdown retained the various treatments developed in earlier bills as 
examples of fair and equitable treatment.58 
These examples were placed in subparagraphs of paragraph (2) of 
§ 1129(b).59 In structure, paragraph (2) has three subparagraphs. In order of 
priority, these subparagraphs give examples of fair and equitable treatment of 
secured claims, unsecured claims, and equity interests. Although a more 
detailed examination is reserved for later, the basic thrust of each of these 
subparagraphs is that “fair and equitable” treatment includes situations in 
which a stakeholder receives property equal in value to the amount of its 
prepetition claim or interest. In short, “fair and equitable” treatment includes 
satisfaction of the claim.60 
These subparagraphs also speak to when the claim is not fully satisfied. In 
those circumstances, “fair and equitable” treatment is present if senior interests 
are not satisfied only when the plan excludes junior interests from the 
reorganization. If unsecured creditors are not paid in full, shareholders cannot 
participate.61 
As the floor remarks made clear, the list of illustrations was not exhaustive; 
courts were not to exclude other components and interpretations.62 The scope 
of these unmentioned, yet nonexcluded items, was broad. These included the 
 
 57 H.R. 8200 § 1129(b)(1), as reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. at 32,376.  
 58 Technically, the bill stated that the fair and equitable treatment “included” the examples. Id. 
§ 1129(b)(2). 
 59 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)–(C) (2012). 
 60 Or, in the context of an equity interest, delivery of property equal in value to the interest. 
There is a somewhat tautological treatment of secured creditors involved in this formulation. Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, a creditor holds a secured claim only to the extent of the value of its collateral. See id. 
§ 506(a). If the debt exceeds the collateral’s value, the creditor holds two claims: a secured claim equal to the 
value of the collateral, and an unsecured claim for the balance. See id. In light of this bifurcation, and because 
the proceeds of collateral cannot be allocated to other creditors without compensation to the secured creditor, 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) does not address less than full payment on a secured claim. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A). 
 61 Obviously, there are exceptions. If the class of senior interests consents, then shareholders can 
participate even if all members of the class are not paid in full. In addition, many courts have recognized that 
junior creditors can contribute new value to the reorganization, and obtain interests in the reorganized debtor 
commensurate with their contributions. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.03[4][c]. 
 62 See 124 CONG. REC. at 32,407 (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 34,006 (statement of Sen. 
DeConcini) (noting “many of the factors interpreting ‘fair and equitable’. . . , which were explicated in the 
description of section 1129(b) in the House report, were omitted from the House amendment . . . . [T]he 
deletion is intended to be one of style and not one of substance”). 
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various components of the rule that: provided step-ups to compensate for loss 
of priority; compensated junior creditors with better or more quickly 
amortizing securities; and increased the amount of the claim protected by the 
amount of post-petition interest.63 
The most obvious omission, however, was the fundamental idea that no 
stakeholder should receive more than its nonbankruptcy entitlement. Put 
another way, no creditor should be paid more than what it is owed. This 
concept was included in the bill the House originally passed;64 Congress, 
however, dropped it in the final bill that became current law. The managers of 
the final bill were at pains to point out that this omission did not mean they 
were eliminating the requirement: “While that requirement [of no 
overpayment] was explicitly included in the House bill, deletion is intended to 
be one of style and not one of substance.”65 The floor managers went on to 
characterize the no-overpayment rule as a “safeguard” for junior classes.66 
Courts have honored this component even though not explicitly 
incorporated: “‘It’s undisputed that the “fair and equitable” requirement 
encompasses a rule that a senior class cannot receive more than full 
compensation for its claims.’”67 
B. Summary: Of “Fair Equivalents” and § 1129(b)(2)’s Examples 
To summarize, the standard for assessing nonconsensual confirmation is 
whether the plan is “fair and equitable” as to each dissenting class. That 
standard is found in paragraph (1) of § 1129(b). Congress used “fair and 
equitable,” admittedly a vague phrase, to capture reorganization practice in 
equity receiverships, and the statutory phrase has guided courts for over 80 
years. For purposes of this Article, three short apothegms can synthesize the 
history and doctrine under this phrase: “don’t pay too little”; “don’t pay too 
much”; and “don’t expect precision.” 
 
 63 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.03[4][b][i][A]–[C]. 
 64 See, e.g., H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1129(b) (Mar. 21, 1977). 
 65 124 CONG. REC. at 32,407 (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 34,006 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
 66 124 CONG. REC. at 32,408 (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 34,007 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
 67 In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd, 513 B.R. 233, 242–43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting In re 
Chemtura Corp., 439 B.R. 561, 592 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)); see also In re Exide Techs., 303 B.R. 48, 61, 66 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 235 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992); In re Future Energy 
Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 495 n.39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, 
¶ 1129.03[4][a][ii]. See generally In re Walat Farms, Inc., 70 B.R. 330, 335 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987). 
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1. Don’t Pay Too Little 
The first apothegm, “don’t pay too little,” stems from the examples in 
paragraph (2) of § 1129(b). They illustrate that payment in full is “fair and 
equitable” treatment. That proposition alone is hardly surprising; you would 
not need a bankruptcy law for that proposition. What bankruptcy law provides 
is that the payment need not be in cash, but only in “property.” That concept 
raises issues of valuation. 
2. Don’t Pay Too Much 
The second apothegm, “don’t pay too much,” stems from the uncodified 
concept of absolute priority that a creditor should not receive more than it is 
due. Again, one would not need a bankruptcy law for this proposition; the law 
of restitution would otherwise cover it. But again, since noncash property can 
constitute payment, the issue remains as to the valuation of the property being 
distributed under the plan. 
3. Don’t Expect Precision 
Finally, the history of reorganization and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of “fair and equitable” justify the final apothegm: “don’t expect 
precision.” As Justice Douglas stated, valuation “requires a prediction as to 
what will occur in the future, [and thus] an estimate, as distinguished from 
mathematical certitude, is all that can be made.”68 He continued this theme two 
years later. When valuing the property a party is receiving in satisfaction of its 
claim, “[a] requirement that dollar values be placed on what each security 
holder surrenders and on what he receives would create an illusion of certainty 
where none exists and would place an impracticable burden on the whole 
reorganization process.”69 More recently, finance literature has echoed these 
insights: “It is unrealistic to expect or demand absolute certainty in valuation, 
since cash flows and discount rates are estimated. This also means that analysts 
 
 68 Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941). 
 69 Grp. of Inst. Inv’rs v. Chi., Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 565 (1943); see also 
Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 288 B.R. 678, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Common sense and the authorities in the area 
suggest that an opinion as to the value of a business should be expressed as a range of values rather than as a 
single number.”), aff’d, 99 F. App’x 274 (2d Cir. 2004); Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706 
(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (“‘Fairness’ is a range, not a point.”). 
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have to give themselves a reasonable margin for error in making 
recommendations on the basis of valuations.”70 
All of this uncertainty leads back to Justice Douglas’s standard for 
assessing whether the value of property offered in a reorganization satisfies 
stakeholders’ interests: “It is sufficient that each security holder in the order of 
his priority receives from that which is available for the satisfaction of his 
claim the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered.”71 In passing on 
whether the plan proponent’s evidence meets this standard of “equitable 
equivalence,” Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, stated that the process 
“requires a comparison of the new securities allotted to [the stakeholder] with 
the old securities which he exchanges to determine whether the new are the 
equitable equivalent of the old.”72 Reiterating what he had said in Consolidated 
Rock Products, he continued: “But that determination cannot be made by the 
use of any mathematical formula.”73 
II. THE PROCESS OF PROPERTY VALUATION IN NONCONSENSUAL 
CONFIRMATION 
At one level, it is all well and good to say that stakeholders are entitled to a 
“fair equivalent” when surrendering their prepetition interests. But any 
assessment of equivalence requires two other determinations: (1) the value of 
the prepetition interest; and (2) the value of the property proposed to be 
transferred in reorganization. 
The value of the prepetition interest, in the case of unsecured debt, is rather 
ministerial. It simply involves calculation of the debt as of the petition date.74 
Matters get complicated, however, if the debt is secured, because then the 
value of the creditor’s prepetition entitlement includes the value of the 
collateral.75 A limit to this complication exists. If the creditor is oversecured—
that is, if its collateral is worth more than the amount of its debt—then the 
 
 70 ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS & TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE 
VALUE OF ANY ASSET 4 (3d ed. 2012); see also ARTHUR KEOWN ET AL., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: 
PRINCIPLES & APPLICATIONS 751 (6th ed. 2012) (“[N]o single dollar value exists for a company.”). 
 71 Grp. of Inst. Inv’rs, 318 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id.  
 74 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012). 
 75 See id. § 506(a).  
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value of the creditor’s interest is simply the face amount of the debt.76 That 
result is the legacy of the “don’t pay too much” line of cases. 
But even if a creditor is oversecured, and the value of its prepetition 
entitlement can be stated with certainty, there is a further wrinkle. There must 
be a valuation of the property the plan proponent proposes to transfer under the 
plan in satisfaction of the agreed prepetition entitlement. This property will 
rarely be cash (although it could be).77 More often, the property will be a 
promise of future payments, such as a promissory note or bond or some other 
income-producing security. Such promises are fairly standard in finance, as is 
their valuation. 
A. Valuing Income Producing Property 
Income producing property involves a promise today to make a payment 
tomorrow, or at some point in the future. But such a promise is rarely worth the 
amount of the promised payment.78 Put simply, a promise to pay $1 tomorrow 
is not worth $1 today. 
That insight is fairly standard, but it leaves an open question: given that $1 
payable tomorrow is not worth $1 today, what is it worth? The study of finance 
can and does quantify the difference. It does so under present value analysis. 
1. Present Value Analysis 
What is “present value”? Start first with an extended example. If you pay 
$100 today to a bank for a one-year certificate of deposit, what would you 
expect the bank to pay you in a year? The common sense response would be: it 
depends on the interest rate being offered by the bank. If 10%, the amount 
would be $110; if 5%, the amount drops to $105.79 The bank’s promise to pay 
you an amount in the future depends on the interest rate it offers upon deposit. 
 
 76 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 416 (1977) (“It is important to note that under section 506(a), the allowed 
amount of the secured claim will not include any extent to which the amount of such claim exceeds the value 
of the property securing such claim.”).  
 77 Id. at 415 (“For example, consider an allowed secured claim of $1,000 in a class by itself. One plan 
could propose to pay $1,000 on account of this claim as of the effective date of the plan . . . [This] plan clearly 
meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) [of § 1129(b)(2)] because the amount received on account of the 
second claim has an equivalent present value as of the effective date of the plan equal to the allowed amount of 
such claim.”). See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).  
 78 Five years ago, I would have said “never” instead of “rarely,” but the advent of negative interest rates 
opens up unexplored areas. 
 79 These examples use simple, and not compounded, interest rates. 
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So the bank could sell you a certificate of deposit—a promise to pay an 
amount in the future—by promising to pay $110 for every $100 invested. 
Simple math would allow the investor assessing this promise to calculate that 
the inherent interest rate on this promise would be 10%. Another way to look 
at this analysis is to take the promise of future payment and reduce it or 
discount it to today’s value. This process is referred to as calculating present 
value.80 
In this context, present value is the concept that reduces the face or notional 
amount of a stream of projected future payments to adjust for the common 
sense insight that $1 a year from now is not worth $1 today. The factor used to 
discount the stream is the “discount rate,” usually expressed as a percentage 
amount.81 
So if a payment of $110 a year from now has a present value today of $100, 
the discount rate is 10%. Higher discount rates mean lower present value; were 
the discount rate 20% in the prior example, the present value of $110 a year 
from now would be $91.67.82 These numbers work in reverse as well. 
2. Present Value Analysis and § 1129(b) 
What do discount rates have to do with cramdown? There are two separate 
explanations. The first has to do with the text of § 1129(b)(2); the second with 
finance. 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, § 1129(b)(2) requires, in three 
places, that a creditor or interest holder receive property “of a value, as of the 
effective date of the plan” equal to some amount, usually the allowed amount 
of the participant’s claim.83 Congress intended that these words incorporate 
present value analysis. As stated in the report accompanying the House bill, 
“[t]his [language] contemplates a present value analysis that will discount 
 
 80 Present value is represented by the formula PV = P/(1+i)n, where P is the future amount, i is the 
discount rate expressed as a decimal, and n is the number of periods discounted. 
 81 ASWATH DAMODARAN, THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION: VALUING YOUNG, DISTRESSED AND COMPLEX 
BUSINESSES 30 (2d ed. 2010) (“When valuing these cash flows, we have to consider risk somewhere, and the 
discount rate is usually the vehicle that we use to convey the concerns that we may have about uncertainty in 
the future. In practical terms, we use higher discount rates to discount riskier cash flows and thus give them a 
lower value than more predictable cash flows.”). See In re Union Meeting Partners, 165 B.R. 553, 572–73 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994), aff’d, 52 F.3d 317 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 82 See H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, 415 (1977) (“[T]he higher the discount rate, the less present value the note 
will have.”).  
 83 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), (B)(i), (C)(i) (2012). 
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value to be received in the future.”84 Despite the changes to § 1129(b) after the 
conference, this form remained the intended construction: “The House report 
accompanying the House bill described what is meant by present value.”85 
3. Present Value and Finance 
Finance theory also adopts a present value analysis. When comparing the 
value of two different streams of income—whether they are the net cash flow 
of a business or of a bond—value is expressed in present value terms. In this 
analysis, the discount rate is key: it is a single number that represents different 
components of risk and reward. In particular, the discount rate will have 
among its elements: the risk-free rate of return (traditionally expressed in terms 
of United States governmental obligations); a component for inflation; and a 
component that measures the risk of repayment. This last component is often 
referred to as the risk premium involved in the transaction.86 
This risk premium is typically calculated by the obligor’s risk profile, taken 
from either its existing financial instruments, or the profiles of similar firms.87 
If the whole firm is being valued, the discount rate is typically the firm’s 
weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”), which is the cost of the different 
components of financing (debt and equity) used by the firm, weighted by their 
market value proportions.88 If a bond issue is being valued, the cost of equity 
would not be factored in (there is no equity in the equation).89 
B. Valuing Debt Issued in Reorganizations 
As seen above, the Code requires a present value analysis, and finance 
theory offers a relatively simple method of computing the present value of debt 
instruments. A quick and facile analysis might indicate that a court should just 
 
 84 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 414 (1977); see id. at 413 (“The property is to be valued as of the effective date 
of the plan, thus recognizing the time-value of money.”). 
 85 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REC. 34,007 (1978) 
(statement of Sen. DeConcini).  
 86 See generally DAMODARAN, supra note 81, at 35–38. For solvent companies, valuation also factors in 
the marginal tax rate of the company being valued. Id.  
 87 Id. at 36.  
 88 See In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd, 513 B.R. 233, 242–43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 89 If the debt is secured by all assets of the company, and the relationship between the debt and the 
collateral essentially means that the lender would have to take over the business if it foreclosed on its 
collateral, WACC might be appropriate, as the promise inherent in the debt instruments is that the debtor will 
yield its business if it defaults. 
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yield to finance experts to value reorganization debt when assessing 
compliance with the absolute priority rule. 
At one level, such an analysis likely works. A reorganized debtor will have 
cash flow, and that cash flow will stand as security for the reorganization debt 
issued. All that remains to be done to value the reorganization debt is to 
employ a present value analysis on the cash flow. 
Present value analysis, however, requires selecting an appropriate discount 
rate. As set forth above, an appropriate discount rate will reflect what is 
traditionally thought to be represented in such a rate: (i) a risk-free rate of 
return; (ii) compensation for inflation; and (iii) a risk premium.90 Courts, 
however, did not uniformly combine or assess these factors in the first twenty-
five years under the Code. 
III. TILL AND DISCOUNT RATES 
Before 2004, courts were all over the map on how to select an appropriate 
discount rate.91 Some courts used the contract rate, some attempted to calculate 
a creditor’s cost in lending money, and still others tried to craft a debtor-
specific interest rate.92 Confusion was common, both in chapter 11 cases and in 
chapter 13 cases, in which § 1325(b)(5)(A) uses the same touchstone language 
invoking present value.93 
A. Till v. SCS Credit 
In 2004, however, the Supreme Court addressed the crucial question of 
how to select an appropriate discount rate for cramdown, at least in the context 
of a chapter 13 case. In Till v. SCS Credit Corp., the discrete issue was the 
appropriate cramdown interest rate in chapter 13.94 The Court ultimately 
decided to use a formula based approach, beginning with the prime rate of 
interest, enhanced by a factor based on the debtor’s riskiness. In particular, the 
Court noted the benefits this approach would have: 
 
 90 See generally DAMODARAN, supra note 81, at 35–38.  
 91 See generally 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][ii].  
 92 Id. ¶ 1129.05[2][c][ii][A]–[C]. 
 93 In chapter 13, creditors do not vote on the debtor’s plan. The Code provides that the debtor may 
confirm the plan if the creditor retains its lien, and if “the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property 
to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such [secured 
creditor’s] claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2012). This language closely tracks the language of section 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 94 541 U.S. 465 (2004).  
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[T]he formula approach entails a straightforward, familiar, and 
objective inquiry, and minimizes the need for potentially costly 
additional evidentiary proceedings. Moreover, the resulting “prime-
plus” rate of interest depends only on the state of financial markets, 
the circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, and the characteristics of 
the loan, not on the creditor’s circumstances or its prior interactions 
with the debtor. For these reasons, the prime-plus or formula rate best 
comports with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.95 
The Court was clear, however, that it believed its analysis of chapter 13’s 
language had broader application. As the Court saw it: 
[T]he Bankruptcy Code includes numerous provisions that, like the 
[Chapter 13] cram down provision, require a court to “discoun[t] . . . 
[a] stream of deferred payments back to the[ir] present dollar 
value,” . . . to ensure that a creditor receives at least the value of its 
claim. We think it likely that Congress intended bankruptcy judges 
and trustees to follow essentially the same approach when choosing 
an appropriate interest rate under any of these provisions.96 
Till indicated that a formula approach based upon the prime rate best 
carries out the intentions of Congress for those sections which require 
discounting to present value.97 The formula approach starts with the prime rate, 
and then adjusts the applicable rate upward based on the particular risks 
presented by the reorganized debtor. 
What is the amount of the increase to be added to the prime rate? The Court 
did not directly decide the proper scale for this risk adjustment factor. It did 
note, however, that other courts had approved adjustments of one to three 
percent (or 100 to 300 basis points), and seemed to suggest that large 
adjustments would not be appropriate because a plan cannot be confirmed 
unless the bankruptcy court finds that the plan is feasible. 
 
 95 Id. at 479–80. 
 96 Id. at 474 (internal citations omitted). In a footnote to this passage, the Court identified those sections 
of the Code it saw as incorporating similar language requiring use of present value analysis. See id. at 474 n.10 
(listing §§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), 1129(a)(7)(B), 1129(a)(9)(B)(i), 1129(a)(9)(C), 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), 
1129(b)(2)(B)(i), 1129(b)(2)(C)(i), 1173(a)(2), 1225(a)(4), 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii), 1228(b)(2), 1325(a)(4), and 
1228(b)(2) as sections of the Code requiring courts to discount future payments back to their present dollar 
value).  
 97 Id. at 479. Although no opinion commanded a majority of five Justices, the plurality opinion of Justice 
Stevens, speaking for four Justices, entered a judgment that reversed the decision and ordered further 
proceedings consistent with that plurality opinion. Id. at 468. Justice Thomas concurred in that judgment, but 
he expressed his view, based upon the language of the statute, that the appropriate rate should be lower, 
including no amount to compensate the creditor for risk. Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
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B. Till and Chapter 11 
Courts have consistently been reluctant to apply Till to chapter 11 cases. 
Initially, Till seems directed at minimizing costs in chapter 13 cases, which can 
ill afford to host costly disputes. That rationale, while not absent from chapter 
11 cases, is certainly minimized in larger chapter 11 cases. In addition, the 
Court seemed to be answering a question they would rather have seen the 
market answer—what is the appropriate rate to compensate lenders in 
bankruptcy? As noted by the Court, “there is no readily apparent chapter 13 
‘cram down market rate of interest’: because every cram down loan is imposed 
by a court over the objection of the secured creditor, there is no free market of 
willing cram down lenders.”98 
The Court, however, went on to note that in certain situations bankruptcy 
courts can look to market rates. In now-notorious footnote 14, the Court said: 
Interestingly, the same is not true in the Chapter 11 context, as 
numerous lenders advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors in 
possession . . . . Thus, when picking a cram down rate in a 
Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to ask what rate an 
efficient market would produce. In the Chapter 13 context, by 
contrast, the absence of any such market obligates courts to 
look to first principles and ask only what rate will fairly 
compensate a creditor for its exposure.99 
 This footnote 14 has led some courts to apply Till only when it appears 
that no efficient market exists for the type of loan at issue.100 One commonality 
in these cases has been a tendency to equate the fact that some chapter 11 
debtors can obtain exit financing with the presence of an efficient market. 
Other courts have simply treated the method employed as a factual matter and 
 
 98 Id. at 476 n.14 (plurality opinion). 
 99 Id. (citations omitted).  
 100 See Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient, Inc.), 420 
F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[Footnote 14] means that the market rate should be applied in Chapter 11 cases 
where there exists an efficient market. But where no efficient market exists for a Chapter 11 debtor, then the 
bankruptcy court should employ the formula approach endorsed by the Till plurality. This nuanced approach 
should obviate the concern of commentators who argue that, even in the Chapter 11 context, there are 
instances where no efficient market exists.”); see also Gen. Elec. Credit Equities, Inc. v. Brice Rd. Devs., 
L.L.C. (In re Brice Rd. Devs., L.L.C.), 392 B.R. 274, 280 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008); In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 
419 B.R. 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 1223109 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 24, 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 627 F.3d 496 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Good, 413 B.R. 552 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Good 
v. RMR Invs., Inc., 428 B.R. 249 (E.D. Tex. 2010); In re Winn-Dixie Stores, 356 B.R. 239 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2006). 
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affirmed reasonable efforts by bankruptcy courts to puzzle out the appropriate 
discount rate.101 
The trend, however, is to the contrary. As recently summarized by the Fifth 
Circuit: “[T]he vast majority of bankruptcy courts have taken the Till 
plurality’s invitation to apply the prime-plus formula under Chapter 11.”102 
When a creditor argued that the Till process produced a rate no lender 
would use, and thus was absurd, the Fifth Circuit responded:  
While [the lender] is undoubtedly correct that no willing lender 
would have extended credit on the terms it was forced to accept under 
the § 1129(b) cramdown plan, this “absurd result” is the natural 
consequence of the prime-plus method, which sacrifices market 
realities in favor of simple and feasible bankruptcy 
reorganizations.103 
C. Till’s Reference to Efficient Markets 
Given this odd policy result, a fair question exists as to whether a court 
may ever use market–derived interest rates as the discount factor under 
§ 1129(b). That is where footnote 14 comes in. To repeat, it states in relevant 
part: 
Because every cram down loan is imposed by a court over the 
objection of the secured creditor, there is no free market of willing 
cram down lenders. Interestingly, the same is not true in the Chapter 
11 context, as numerous lenders advertise financing for Chapter 11 
debtors in possession . . . . Thus, when picking a cram down rate in a 
Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to ask what rate an efficient 
market would produce. In the Chapter 13 context, by contrast, the 
absence of any such market obligates courts to look to first principles 
 
 101 See Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C. (In re Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel 
Realty, L.L.C.), 710 F.3d 324, 331 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We will not tie bankruptcy courts to a specific 
methodology as they assess the appropriate Chapter 11 cramdown rate of interest; rather, we continue to 
review a bankruptcy court’s entire cramdown-rate analysis only for clear error.”). 
 102 Id. at 333.  
 103 Id. at 336. Indeed, Justice Thomas essentially took this position in Till: “The dissent might be correct 
that the use of the prime rate, even with a small risk adjustment, ‘will systematically undercompensate secured 
creditors for the true risks of default.’ This systematic undercompensation might seem problematic as a matter 
of policy. But, it raises no problem as a matter of statutory interpretation.” 541 U.S. at 488 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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and ask only what rate will fairly compensate a creditor for its 
exposure.104 
This passage has been correctly criticized for confusing debtor in 
possession financing with exit financing.105 The argument runs that if the Court 
used a supporting premise unrelated to its conclusion (that debtor in possession 
financing is available), then its conclusion (that the use of market rates “might 
make sense”), does not follow. That logical misstep might be enough to raise 
questions regarding the propriety of the use of market rates. But the use of 
false premises does not necessarily doom a conclusion to the scrapheap. It 
might be right for other reasons. 
So if we ignore the logical error, what is the rule in chapter 11? All the 
Court gives us is a very short and cryptic dicta: “[I]t might make sense to ask 
what rate an efficient market would produce.”106 
Two points are worth making here. First, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the phrase “it might make sense to ask” is not all that strong an 
indication courts must use market rates when the reorganization debt’s market 
is efficient, especially if the selection of a discount rate is a matter of fact.107 In 
addition, the Court’s words do not mandate use of market rates; they only 
require the bankruptcy court “to ask” what rate an efficient market would 
yield.108 If § 1129(b)(2) mandates the use of market rates, that rule will have to 
be clarified in further cases. 
The second point is more nuanced. Even the strongest advocates for 
market-based discount rates must concede that the Court’s dicta states that if 
there is no efficient market, prevailing rates are not automatically adopted. In 
these circumstances “courts . . . look to first principles and ask only what rate 
will fairly compensate a creditor for its exposure.”109 As indicated above, Till 
refers to the consideration of market rates in chapter 11 only if there is an 
“efficient” market for cram down loans. Is there? 
 
 104 Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 
 105 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][i].  
 106 Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14 (plurality opinion). 
 107 As a determination of fact, review would be controlled by the clearly erroneous standard of review. 
See infra Section VI.B. 
 108 Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14.  
 109 Id. 
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1. Is There a Market for Cramdown Debt? 
To determine whether there is an efficient market for chapter 11 cramdown 
loans, the first question to ask is whether there is even a market. This requires 
reflection on what a market is. Markets are not necessarily physical; they are 
mediums or processes that clear and establish prices on goods or services. At 
issue in cramdown situations is the value of a promise. That promise is to 
repay certain borrowed sums at a set rate of interest. A facile argument would 
run that such promises are brokered every day: car loans, home loans, 
corporate bonds, and the like all represent promises for which there appear to 
be established markets. Consumers know where and how to shop consumer 
loans such as car loans and mortgages; corporations know to go to the capital 
markets for floating bonds or issuing other debt securities. 
But there are strong commonalities among these types of loans. They each 
rely on standard forms. Standard forms pervade consumer loans and bond 
indentures.110 Individuals and entities that buy and trade these loans after their 
origination thus know their terms, their covenants, and their provisions. 
Such may not be the case with cramdown loans. As Till observed in 
footnote 14: “Because every cram down loan is imposed by a court over the 
objection of the secured creditor, there is no free market of willing cram down 
lenders.”111 The Court also noted that the Code 
does not require that the terms of the cram down loan match the 
terms to which the debtor and creditor agreed prebankruptcy, nor 
does it require that the cram down terms make the creditor 
subjectively indifferent between present foreclosure and future 
payment. Indeed, the very idea of a “cram down” loan precludes the 
latter result: By definition, a creditor forced to accept such a loan 
would prefer instead to foreclose.112  
In short, the nonconsensual nature of reorganization debt issued in a cramdown 
may very well exclude it from markets for loans of similar amount or duration 
made by non-debtor entities. 
 
 110 Standard forms dominate consumer transactions, as every law student who tries to independently draft 
a car loan or a mortgage soon finds out. In the world of corporate bond indentures, efforts such as those of the 
American Bar Association ensure similarity, if not uniformity, in most bond indenture provisions. See Tr. 
Indentures & Indenture Trs. Comm., American Bar Ass’n, Annotated Trust Indenture Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 977 
(2012). 
 111 Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14 (2004). 
 112 Id. at 476. 
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But plan proponents may intend to float reorganization debt or other 
securities to the public; thus, the reorganized debt or securities may be 
designed to be traded on a public market. That reality raises questions about 
whether the public markets can fairly price the reorganization debt. 
2. If There Is a Market, Is it Efficient? 
In Till, Justice Scalia dissented in part because he was willing to assume 
that the subprime debt markets that produced the contract at issue were 
“competitive and therefore largely efficient.”113 The plurality responded that 
“several considerations suggest that the subprime market is not, in fact, 
perfectly competitive.”114 These considerations included a disparity of power 
between the normal participants, which leads to informational asymmetry, a 
condition the Till plurality noted that tends to preclude economic efficiency.115 
This raises the question of whether any market in cramdown loans for a 
corporate bankruptcy debtor is, or can be, “efficient.”116 Initially, it is unclear 
exactly what the Court thought was an “efficient” market. There are many 
views on this, but for purposes of this Article, I will discuss two: the lay view 
and the economist’s view. 
a. “Efficient” as Understood by Non-Economists: The Lay View 
The lay view117 likely takes the position that an efficient market is one that 
works without much effort because the standard terms and conditions are set, 
and only a few points need to be dickered to complete a deal. It is efficient 
because people use it in hundreds if not thousands of transactions every day. 
The process moves quickly, without any time spent on decisions that do not 
seem to matter. Put crudely, an efficient market does not waste anyone’s time. 
Car loans, such as the one present in Till, might be thought to represent 
such a market. Cars are bought and sold on long, fourteen-inch forms, densely 
filled with small type. But the parties typically focus only on several terms, 
 
 113 Id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 114 Id. at 481 (plurality opinion). 
 115 Id. at 478 (plurality opinion). 
 116 For purposes of this discussion, I assume that Till referred to notions from economics and finance in 
using the term “efficient,” although as indicated below, that may not be an unobjectionable assumption.  
 117 The concept of a “lay” understanding is my own construct. “Efficient” as used in everyday 
conversation has a much different meaning than “efficient” as used by economists. This section tries to capture 
the sense non-economists understand when they first hear of the concept of an “efficient” market. 
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such as price, trade-in value, and other terms that seemingly have a more direct 
and immediate impact on the consumer and the seller. So too with most 
consumer loans and mortgages: the forms are standardized so that the debt 
obligation can be freely sold and traded in the secondary market. 
The abundance of such loans gives some comfort that there is a rate set 
without necessary reference to a particular debtor involved. The “market” of 
consumer loans determines the general risk for such loans. All a consumer has 
to do is to meet the minimum credit score requirements. The Court’s use of the 
“prime rate” in Till—a generalized rate offered to banks’ “best customers”—
supports the view that the Court was looking for something extrinsic to the 
debtor to validate the discount rate chosen.118 
But this method ultimately is unsatisfactory for purposes of chapter 11. 
Although there is a market for loans to corporate debtors, it does not exist on 
the scale, and with the standardization of, consumer loans. There is more 
reason to believe that the terms of a particular loan are set with reference to 
subjective evaluations of the creditworthiness of the debtor, rather than with 
reference to an objective market place able to assess and price such corporate 
loans.  
Given the Court’s efforts in Till to arrive at a general rate that compensates 
creditors but does not require extensive proof of the debtor’s loan 
qualifications, this concept of efficiency is not likely the one Till contemplated 
in footnote 14. There is a concept of efficiency, however, in economics and 
finance literature, and it is worth looking at. 
b. “Efficient” as Understood by Economists 
The economists’ view is that prices in an economically efficient market 
should, in theory, reflect all relevant information about a business or asset.119 
Till recognized this view: “[I]f all relevant information about the debtor’s 
circumstances, the creditor’s circumstances, the nature of the collateral, and the 
market for comparable loans were equally available to both debtor and 
creditor, then in theory the formula and presumptive contract rate approaches 
would yield the same final interest rate.”120 In such cases, market prices will 
 
 118 Till, 541 U.S. 479–80. 
 119 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. (PAPERS & PROC.) 383, 383 (1970). 
 120 Till, 541 U.S. at 484. 
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approximate the value estimated by cash flow and other non-market 
measures—sometimes called “intrinsic value.”121 When markets are not 
efficient, prices trend away from intrinsic value, a fact that reorganization 
cases of the last seventy-five years have recognized. 
In the world of finance, the efficient market hypothesis holds that an 
efficient market is one in which prices fully reflect all known or available 
information about the asset being traded.122 There are several versions of the 
efficient market hypothesis: a weak version, in which market prices reflect all 
past price patterns; a “semi-strong” version, in which market prices reflect past 
price patterns and all other publically available information; and a “strong” 
version, in which market prices reflect not only all publicly-available 
information, but also all private information held by insiders.123 One 
consequence of an efficient market is that no investor can consistently beat the 
market and enjoy above-average returns without incurring above-average risks; 
the efficiency of the market in absorbing information and reflecting that 
information in price changes would defeat any strategy. This notion is captured 
by a standard joke: 
A well-known story tells of a finance professor and a student who 
come across a $100 bill lying on the ground. As the student stops to 
pick it up, the professor says, “Don’t bother—if it were really a $100 
bill, it wouldn’t be there.”124 
Efficiency is treated as having two “flavors”: informational efficiency and 
fundamental value efficiency.125 Informational efficiency reflects the market’s 
ability to assimilate and distribute new information, and to reflect the 
consequence of the information in the asset’s trading price. Fundamental value 
efficiency, in turn, is a correlative concept that reflects the market’s ability to 
 
 121 DAMODARAN, supra note 81, at 23 (“What is intrinsic value? Consider it the value that would be 
attached to an asset by an all-knowing analyst with access to all information available right now and a perfect 
valuation model. No such analyst exists, of course, but we all aspire to be as close as we can to this perfect 
analyst.”). 
 122 See, e.g., Fama, supra note 119, at 383 (“A market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available 
information is called ‘efficient.’”); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to 
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 (2003) (“According to the most common definition, a market is 
‘efficient’ when prices always fully reflect available information.”). 
 123 These distinctions were first developed in Eugene F. Fama, supra note 119, at 383.  
 124 Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 60 (2003). 
As the author notes, this “story well illustrates what financial economists usually mean when they say markets 
are efficient.” Id.  
 125 J. Alex Milburn, The Relationship Between Fair Value, Market Value, and Efficient Markets, 7 ACCT. 
PERSP. 293, 298–99 (2008). 
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impound or incorporate the new information in a way that reflects fundamental 
or intrinsic value.126 
There are problems with each form of efficiency. Informational efficiency 
has been criticized for its bias towards short-term, easily digestible 
information: 
Information that is easy to understand and that is trumpeted in the 
business media—for example, merger announcements or news of a 
stock split—may be incorporated into market prices almost 
instantaneously. But information that is “public” but difficult to get 
hold of, or information that is complex or requires a specialist’s 
knowledge to comprehend, may take weeks or months to be fully 
incorporated into prices. Indeed it may never be fully incorporated at 
all.127 
Fundamental value efficiency examines bias in interpreting and incorporating 
public information into prices. As noted by J. Alex Milburn, “[t]here is much 
discussion in the literature of potential fundamental value biases in capital 
market prices. These include the effects of regulation and transaction costs and 
limitations of arbitrage in linking markets and in limiting short selling . . . ; and 
cognitive limitations and irrational behavior.”128 Added to this is a fundamental 
problem with value efficiency: it cannot be tested. It assumes the mistake in 
valuation that it tries to prove the market made. As one author has observed, 
“[f]undamental value is not a falsifiable number.”129 
There are many reasons to believe that markets in the debt of bankruptcy 
debtors are not efficient markets capable of reflecting all relevant information 
about a bankruptcy debtor.130 A critique of a pure market valuation perspective 
recently stated: 
To them, the market appears as their deus ex machina. . . . But the 
authors’ preference for market evidence, to the exclusion of expert 
opinion, dictates exposure to market ambiguities and inefficiencies. 
These include (i) the vague definition of the term “markets”; (ii) the 
 
 126 Id. at 298–300. 
 127 Stout, supra note 122, at 656. 
 128 Milburn, supra note 125, at 299.  
 129 William T. Allen, Securities Markets As Social Products: The Pretty Efficient Capital Markets 
Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551, 558 (2003). 
 130 This lack of information and other uncertainties can drive up the discount rate. In one study, for 
example, the authors found that creditors in bankruptcy often use an implicit discount rate of over 75%. 
Fabrice Barthélémy, Timothy C.G. Fisher & Jocelyn Martel, What Discount Rate Should Bankruptcy Judges 
Use? Estimates from Canadian Reorganization Data, 29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 67, 68 (2009). 
MARKELL GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/15/2016 3:05 PM 
2016] FAIR EQUIVALENTS AND MARKET PRICES 119 
challenges particular to valuing a business in distress compared to a 
stable company; (iii) the inefficiency of trading distressed securities, 
including lack of research coverage and delisting; and (iv) a 
presumption that federal judges, schooled in law and not necessarily 
in market theory and operation, can intuitively sense distortions and 
errors.131 
If these cracks in the efficiency market hypothesis generally were not 
enough to question its applicability to reorganization securities, then other 
concerns might be. Debt securities markets have not been the focus of most of 
the efficient market hypothesis literature; equity securities have.132 Courts have 
noticed this lacuna; a common observation was made in Newby v. Enron Corp. 
(In re Enron Corp. Securities Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation): “No standard 
at all appears to have been established for measuring market efficiency for debt 
securities. Adding to that difficulty, thus far there is little scholarly literature 
about, and only a few courts have addressed, market efficiency for bonds.”133 
This uncertainty reflects a continuing debate over efficiency in debt markets in 
the academic field as well.134 
And although there is very little discussion regarding markets in 
bankruptcy, it appears that most studies just assume a lack of any efficient 
 
 131 Robert J. Stark, Jack F. Williams & Anders J. Maxwell, Market Evidence, Expert Opinion, and the 
Adjudicated Value of Distressed Businesses, 68 BUS. LAW. 1039, 1059–60 (2013). 
 132 See, e.g., Hui-Ju Tsai, The Informational Efficiency of Bonds and Stocks: The Role of Institutional 
Sized Bond Trades, 31 INT’L REV. ECON. & FIN. 34, 34 (2014) (“Although there is extensive research on the 
informational efficiency of stock markets, the studies on the informational efficiency of bond markets were 
quite limited until . . . 2002.”). 
 133 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2006); see also Thomas S. Green, Comment, An Analysis of the 
Advantages of Non-Market Based Approaches for Determining Chapter 11 Cramdown Rates: A Legal and 
Financial Perspective, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1151, 1172–75 (2016). 
 134 See, e.g., Aurelio Fernández Bariviera, M. Belén Guercio & Lisana B. Martinez, Informational 
Efficiency in Distressed Markets: The Case of European Corporate Bonds, 45 ECON. & SOC. REV. 349, 351 
(2014) (“Corporate bond markets are some of the least studied markets in the financial literature.”); Chris 
Downing, Shane Underwood & Yuhang Xing, The Relative Informational Efficiency of Stocks and Bonds: An 
Intraday Analysis, 44 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1081, 1081–82 (2009) (noting that because the 
“market for corporate bonds has long been relatively opaque[,] . . . previous studies of the relation between 
stock and bond returns have drawn conflicting conclusions from dealer quotes of uncertain quality, or narrow 
datasets that leave the generality of the results open to question”); Umit G. Gurun, Rick Johnston & Stanimir 
Markov, Sell-Side Debt Analysts and Debt Market Efficiency, 62 MGMT. SCI. 682, 682 (2015) (“[T]he public 
debt market is on average larger than the equity market . . . , but it is also less liquid and less efficient . . . .”); 
Konstantinos Tolikas, The Relative Informational Efficiency of Corporate Retail Bonds: Evidence from the 
London Stock Exchange, 46 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS. 191, 192 (2016) (“[C]orporate bonds usually trade in a 
rather opaque environment with only a few market professionals that have access to information such as the 
prices at which dealers are willing to transact and the actual prices of completed bond trades. As a result, the 
literature on various aspects of the corporate bond markets is quite limited and rather inconclusive.”).  
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market given the individualized negotiations that occur in bankruptcy when 
reaching terms on reorganization debt. As was summarized by Professor 
Gilson and others: 
The factors that lead to a reliable estimate of value in a market 
process are absent in bankruptcy. There is no active market for 
control of the assets of the bankrupt firm because it is strongly 
discouraged by the structure of Chapter 11. There is no oversight 
from the capital markets because management has access to debtor-
in-possession financing. The securities of bankrupt firms often trade 
infrequently. . . . Perhaps as a result, there is very limited analyst 
coverage. This absence of market forces makes valuation more 
complex and less precise.135 
All of these doubts lend credence to the Court’s dubiety over an efficient 
market in car loans expressed in Till.136 
These ambiguities and inefficiencies have caused some judges to rely upon 
matters related to intrinsic valuations. The reason is simple. As stated by Judge 
Sontchi: “In the majority of instances in Chapter 11 in which valuation is 
implicated, . . . market data will be unavailable or inapplicable.”137 
Even if there were efficient debt markets, it is not clear that the price 
obtained in such a market will provide the type of value required by the 
historic reorganization cases and § 1129(b)(2). First, rates for new loans have 
components not appropriate for a cramdown, such as initiation costs and profit 
components.138 This fact points to two possible conclusions. First, any court 
dealing with so-called market evaluations must reduce the “market” rate to 
negate such profit elements. Second, the court should conclude that the market 
for bonds or loans generally is not the same market as reorganization debt, 
given that reorganization debt has at least an implicit assumption that the debt 
 
 135 Stuart C. Gilson, Edith S. Hotchkiss & Richard S. Ruback, Valuation of Bankrupt Firms, 13 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 43, 43–44 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 
 136 Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 481 (2004) (“Moreover, several considerations suggest that the 
subprime market is not, in fact, perfectly competitive.”). 
 137 Christopher S. Sontchi, Valuation Methodologies: A Judge’s View, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 14 
(2012). 
 138 See GMAC v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 63–64 (2d Cir. 1997), (stating that cramdown is 
intended to “put the creditor in the same economic position that it would have been in had it received the value 
of its allowed claim immediately. . . . [T]he value of a creditor’s allowed claim does not include any degree of 
profit. The purpose is not to put the creditor in the same position that it would have been in had it arranged a 
‘new’ loan”). 
MARKELL GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/15/2016 3:05 PM 
2016] FAIR EQUIVALENTS AND MARKET PRICES 121 
will be held to term and not traded. Either one of these conclusions is 
inconsistent with an efficient market. 
Second, a related notion is that just because there are willing buyers and 
sellers of such debt does not mean that there are willing buyers and sellers of 
cramdown loans generally—indeed, the whole structure of cramdown seeks to 
relieve the debtor and its other creditors of the lack of a seamless market in 
reorganization debt. The full and precise payment of secured creditors is a 
lesser value than the reorganization of a viable company—so long as the 
secured creditor receives the equitable equivalent of the value of its prepetition 
debt. 
Finally, an efficient market typically assumes that all past and present 
relevant information is known to the market participants. While this may be 
arguable for general debt securities, it is not tenable for reorganization debt. 
Such debt is typically the subject of litigation and negotiation between and 
among the relevant parties—with the motives and the offers and counteroffers 
remaining private. A debtor in possession, for example, may offer or accept an 
interest rate not because it bears some symbiotic relationship to a market rate, 
but because it is a compromise for give and take on other issues.  
An example might be a lender’s acceptance of a lower rate in return for an 
agreement not to pursue preferences or fraudulent transfers—price decisions 
particular to the holders of the debt but irrelevant to any market participant 
who might buy the debt instrument down the way. Put another way, the rates 
the parties demand or offer are not rates designed for a market trade or 
necessarily connected to the risks and rewards of the debt to which they are 
attached. As Professor Gilson has noted: “U.S. bankruptcy law resolves 
valuation through negotiation.”139 
IV. MOMENTIVE AND CHAPTER 11 
The debate over Till’s application in chapter 11 came to a flash point in 
August of 2014 when Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain of the Southern District 
of New York issued a decision confirming a chapter 11 plan for Momentive 
Performance Materials Inc. (“Momentive”).140 As chapter 11 plans go, the 
broad structure of Momentive’s plan was fairly vanilla financial restructuring: 
 
 139 Gilson, Hotchkiss & Ruback, supra note 135, at 44.  
 140 Momentive, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R. 
321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015).  
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junior levels of debt agreed to cancel their interests, contribute cash, and 
receive all the equity interests in the reorganized debtor.141 All interests, debt 
or equity, junior to them would be eliminated.142 General unsecured creditors 
would be undisturbed and paid in full.143 Secured creditors would be paid in 
accordance with the Code.144 
This last point, however, proved contentious. There was no agreement on 
what the secured creditors were due, or what constituted permissible treatment 
of their claims. For their part, the secured creditors, who were oversecured, 
believed that they were owed not only their principal and accrued interest, but 
also a “make whole” premium—a sum of cash calculated to compensate a 
lender for prepayment of an above-market loan. The debtors countered that 
such make whole premiums were not payable under the loan documents, and in 
any event ran contrary to the Code’s disallowance of unmatured interest.  
As an alternative to litigating the dispute, the debtor proposed a plan with a 
so-called “death trap” voting provision145: if the class of secured creditors 
voted for the plan, the class members would receive a cash payment equal to 
their principal and accrued interest, albeit without any payment of a contested 
make whole premium.146 
If, however, the secured creditor class rejected the plan, the cash payment 
was off the table. Instead, the debtor would cram down the secured creditors’ 
claims over approximately seven years at an interest rate of 4.1% to 4.85%,147 
a rate not only below that stated in the original debt instruments, but also 
below what Momentive had agreed to pay to obtain a loan facility to take out 
the lenders had they accepted the plan. Indeed, when Momentive filed its Form 
10-K after consummating its plan, it estimated that the rate ultimately imposed 
 
 141 See Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Momentive Performance 
Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors at 28–54, Momentive, No. 14-22503-rdd (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 
2014), ECF No. 516, 2014 WL 4255110, at *28–54. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id.  
 144 Id. 
 145 Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at *11. These provisions are often called “toggle provisions,” or “fish-
or-cut-bait” provisions.  
 146 Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Momentive Performance 
Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 141, at 35–36. Make whole premiums are amounts payable 
upon payment of a loan before maturity that are designed to compensate a lender for the interest that will not 
accrue due to early payment. 
 147 Id. The rate in the plan was even lower; Judge Drain increased the risk premium by 50 basis points, or 
0.5% overall. Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at *32. 
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was approximately 87% of what a market rate would be.148 Some 
commentators have estimated that this discount cost the secured creditors $200 
million.149 
Intense debate has followed Judge Drain’s decision.150 This Article takes 
the position that his decision was correct, and should be affirmed, even though 
it was not the only correct decision that could have been made. 
A. The Debtor 
Momentive was in the silicone business. It had over $2.1 billion in sales in 
the year before bankruptcy and employed over 4,500 people. It also had been 
the subject of a leveraged buyout from Apollo Global Management in 2006.151 
It also had a lot of debt—more than 16 times its annual cash flow before taxes 
and depreciation.152 
B. The Secured Parties 
Much of Momentive’s debt was incurred in 2012, when Momentive had 
issued two classes of senior secured notes. The first series, in the amount of 
$1.1 billion, was issued at an interest rate of 8.875% (“First Lien Notes”).153 
The second series, in the amount of $250 million, was issued at an interest rate 
of 10% (“1.5 Lien Notes”).154 Both the First Lien Notes and the 1.5 Lien Notes 
matured in 2020.155 Both series were secured by all or virtually all of 
Momentive’s assets. 
Momentive issued a third series of secured notes in 2010. These notes were 
in the aggregate principal amount of $1.161 billion, and were secured by the 
same assets, but were contractually junior in priority to the First Lien Notes 
 
 148 Momentive Performance Materials, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 51 (Mar. 30, 2015). 
 149 Michael Vitti, Taking a Deeper Look into Momentive, Part 1, QUICKREAD (Dec. 22, 2015), http:// 
quickreadbuzz.com /2015/12/22/taking-a-deeper-look-into-momentive-part-1/. 
 150 See, e.g., Alec P. Ostrow, Chapter 11 Cramdown Interest Rates: The Momentum Tilts Toward Chapter 
13, in 2015 NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 3; Mark J. Thompson & Katie M. McDonough, Lost in 
Translation: Till v. SCS Credit Corp. and the Mistaken Transfer of a Consumer Bankruptcy Repayment 
Formula to Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 893, 923 (2015). 
 151 Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Momentive Performance 
Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 141, at 17–23. 
 152 Id. at 28. 
 153 Id. at 24.  
 154 Id. at 25. 
 155 Id. at 24–25.  
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and the 1.5 Lien Notes.156 They were set to mature in 2021.157 Apollo, who had 
engineered Momentive’s leveraged buyout, held most of the notes. It also 
beneficially held most of the equity in the debtor.158 
C. Confirmation and Cramdown 
Momentive’s disclosure statement indicated that it had a debt-free value of 
somewhere between $2 billion and $2.4 billion.159 No party seriously 
challenged this entity valuation,160 even though this valuation put Apollo’s 
Second Lien Notes at risk of being at least partially undersecured while 
confirming that the First Lien Notes and the 1.5 Notes were oversecured. At 
the same time, the prepetition debt service on all Momentive’s debt was 
approximately $288 million per year, some $200 million more than its earnings 
before taxes and depreciation.161 
To reduce this debt service, Momentive sought to take advantage of the fact 
that the market had changed from 2012 when it had issued the First and 1.5 
Lien Notes—interest rates had dropped significantly. In such circumstances, it 
is textbook bankruptcy law that a debtor can cram down a secured creditor’s 
claim by giving it a continuing lien on its collateral and a stream of payments 
that has a present value equal to the allowed amount of its claim.162 This 
treatment favors debtors because the interest rate necessary to discount the 
stream of payments will track interest rates extant at the time of the bankruptcy 
filing. Using these reduced rates, a debtor can essentially unilaterally refinance 
its existing debt at lower rates. 
But the lenders had anticipated this strategy. Their loan documents required 
Momentive to pay make whole premiums in the case of any prepayment.163 
Essentially, a make whole premium is an amount equal to the lost interest 
 
 156 Id. at 25.  
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 27 (noting Apollo owned a “significant portion of the Second Lien Notes”). 
 159 Notice of Filing of Certain Exhibits to Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of 
Reorganization for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors at 43, Exhibit C, In re 
MPM Silicones, LLC (Momentive), No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2014), 
aff’d, 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015), 2014 WL 
2917134, at *43. 
 160 See Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at *10.  
 161 Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Momentive Performance 
Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 141, at 26–28. 
 162 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.04[2][a].  
 163 See Momentive, 2014 WL 4637175, at *10. 
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between (1) what was originally agreed to be paid if the loan were held to 
maturity; and (2) the interest paid to the date of the prepayment. In the end, the 
goal is to put the secured creditor in the same position as if the loan had not 
been repaid.164 
Momentive, understandably, did not want to pay that much. So it proposed 
a plan under which, if the noteholder classes accepted, Momentive would pay 
cash to the First Lien Notes and the 1.5 Lien Notes in an amount equal to their 
face amount, along with accrued interest.165 The amounts to be paid, however, 
did not include any amount allocable to the make whole premiums.166 
Momentive would finance this payment by borrowing money under a facility 
previously obtained at the time of the bankruptcy filing.167 
If the noteholders rejected this proposed treatment, Momentive created a 
“death trap”: a different and less favorable treatment if it had to confirm the 
plan over the note holders’ objections. The less favorable treatment still 
purported to pay the note holders in full, without payment of the make whole 
premium.168 Momentive no longer, however, would pay cash.169 Rather, it 
proposed to give a note that would pay the claims over time at an interest rate 
crafted according to Till. 
This crafted interest rate, to no one’s surprise, was low—the debtor keyed 
the rate payable to the seven-year Treasury note rate plus 1.5% for the First 
Lien Notes, and the same Treasury note rate plus 2% for the 1.5 Lien Notes.170 
These rates worked out initially to be 3.6% on the First Lien Notes and 4.1% 
on the 1.5 Lien Notes.171 In short, they went for broke in suggesting Till 
controlled. Judge Drain gave reasoned support to their position.  
 
 164 See Bruce A. Markell, “Shoot the. . .”: Holes in Make Whole Premiums, 36 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 5 
(Thomson Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), May 2016, at 1, 2–3, 4, for my discussion of the make-whole premiums 
issues in Momentive. 
 165 Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Momentive Performance 
Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 141, at 35–36. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 40. The interest rate payable on this facility was more than the proposed interest rate on the 
replacement notes. 
 168 Id. at 35–36. 
 169 Id.  
 170 Momentive, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335, at *24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 
B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015). 
 171 Id. 
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D. Till Adopted; Market Spurned 
Judge Drain started his analysis by restating Till: in chapter 13, the 
applicable statute does not require a market-based analysis, but rather permits a 
discount rate tied to the prime rate.172 He then assessed whether the Court’s 
interpretation of chapter 13’s provision, § 1325(a)(5), had relevance in chapter 
11. He found it did, quoting the Supreme Court to the effect that: “Congress 
likely intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow essentially the same 
approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate under any of the many 
Code provisions requiring a court to discount a stream of deferred payments 
back to their present dollar value.”173 
From this perspective, he compared §§ 1325(a)(5) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) 
and concluded that “there is no sufficiently contrary basis to distinguish the 
chapter 13 and chapter 11 plan contexts in light of the similarity of the 
language of the two provisions and the underlying present value concept that 
Till recognized should be applied uniformly throughout the Code.”174 Judge 
Drain then categorized and dismissed, as did the Court in Till, various market-
based discount rates produced by the coerced loan and presumptive contract 
rate. These methods sought to give the secured creditor in essence a refinanced 
new loan by using a discount rate provided by the market and the individual 
costs of the creditor.  
As the bankruptcy court stated, “[t]he purpose is not to put the creditor in 
the same position that it would have been in had it arranged a ‘new’ loan.”175 
So what was the goal? As Judge Drain noted: 
Till distinguished the cramdown rate from market loans; the former 
does not require the lender to be indifferent compared to the result in 
a foreclosure, where the creditor could then re-lend the proceeds in 
the marketplace, and should not “overcompensate[] creditors because 
the market lending rate must be high enough to cover factors, like 
lenders’ transaction costs and overall profits, that are no longer 
relevant in the context of court-administered and court-supervised 
cramdown loans.”176 
 
 172 Id. at *23–24. 
 173 Id. at *24 (quoting Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004)).  
 174 Id. at *24. 
 175 Id. at *25 (quoting In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55, 63–64 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 176 Id. (quoting Till, 541 U.S. at 476–77). 
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The cramdown rate analysis, therefore, should focus on a rate that does not 
take market factors into account but, rather, starts with the riskless rate 
applicable to all obligations to be paid over time, adjusted for the risks unique 
to the debtor in actually completing such payment.177 
Judge Drain then restated how to apply a Till formula-based rate: 
Under the formula approach, the proper rate for secured lenders’ 
cramdown notes begins with a risk-free base rate, such as the prime 
rate used in Till, or the Treasury rate used in GMAC v. Valenti (In re 
Valenti), which is then adjusted by a percentage reflecting a risk 
factor based on the circumstances of the debtor’s estate, the nature of 
the collateral security and the terms of the cramdown note itself, and 
the duration and feasibility of the plan.178 
The risk factor adjustment then concerned the court. After noting that Till 
stated that “no adjustment whatsoever to the risk-free rate would be required if 
the Court found that the debtors were certain to perform their obligations under 
the replacement notes,”179 the court concluded that market-based assessments 
of a discount rate particular to Momentive were not to be considered. As Judge 
Drain summarized: 
Therefore, as a first principle, the cramdown interest rate, under 
section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Code, should not contain any 
profit or cost element, which were rejected by Till and the Second 
Circuit in Valenti as inconsistent with the present-value approach for 
cramdown purposes. In addition, market-based evidence should not 
be considered, except, arguably and, if so secondarily, when setting a 
proper risk premium in the formula approach taken by Till and 
Valenti.180 
But what about footnote 14 and its suggestion of possibly different 
treatment for chapter 11 debtors? Judge Drain dismissed these arguments. 
First, he noted that the Supreme Court meant footnote 14 to acknowledge the 
involuntary nature of cramdown. The purpose of cramdown is not to provide 
property to creditors under terms that they would voluntarily make; it is to 
deliver to creditors a fair equivalent of their entitlements, even though the 
 
 177 Id. (quoting Till, 541 U.S. at 477–78) (citations omitted). 
 178 Id. at *26. 
 179 Id. The court quoted the Supreme Court: “We note that if the Court could somehow be certain a debtor 
would complete his plan, the prime rate would be adequate to compensate any secured creditors forced to 
accept cramdown loans.” Id. (quoting Till, 541 U.S. at 479 n.18). 
 180 Id. 
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creditor may not agree.181 Second, he noted the inapplicability of the Court’s 
reference in footnote 14 to debtor in possession financing to cramdown 
discount rates; the two types of loans operate on completely different 
assumptions.182 Finally, Judge Drain rejected the creditor’s argument that 
market rates should control when the market is efficient. The creditors argued 
that this criterion was satisfied if, as was the case with Momentive, there was 
trading in the debt.183 Judge Drain rejected this argument, pointing out that the 
Court itself in Till was not convinced that the market for auto loans—
ubiquitous and numerous as they may be—was an efficient market.184 
The bankruptcy court then argued that Till was inconsistent with a two-step 
process taken by other courts—that is, figure out if a market is efficient, and 
then, only if it is not, apply Till.185 The disconnect is that reorganization 
discount values are not market substitutes; it is simply not the case that the 
goal is to give the creditor property that the creditor can immediately turn 
around and sell and receive 100% of its claim. 
The creditors next made a superficially appealing argument. The debtor had 
negotiated and obtained a take-out facility of over $1 billion to pay the note 
holders in case they accepted the plan.186 That facility carried a higher rate than 
the cramdown rate proposed, a rate closer to 6% than to the 4% offered.187 
Since the loan facility was specific to Momentive, the creditors contended its 
interest rate should be used as the discount rate.  
Judge Drain rejected this argument.188 
[I]t is clear to me that no private lender, including the lenders who the 
debtors have obtained backup takeout commitments from, would lend 
without a built-in profit element, let alone recovery for costs and fees, 
which also, as discussed above, is contrary to Till and Valenti’s first 
principles and the purpose of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).189 
 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at *27. 
 183 The creditors believed such a market existed for the reorganizations debt. The creditors’ opening brief 
on appeal to the district court contained a graph of the market trading in the First Lien and 1.5 Lien notes. 
Reply Brief for Appellants at 4, BOKF, NA v. Momentive Performance Materials, Inc. (In re MPM Silicones, 
LLC), 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Nos. 14 CV 7471(VB), et al.), ECF No. 17. 
 184 Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at * 27.  
 185 Id. at *28. 
 186 Id. at *29.  
 187 Id. 
 188 Id.  
 189 Id.  
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The creditors then engaged in a battle of the experts over the relative risk 
factors—the “plus” factor Till requires to be added to the base rate chosen.190 
In this regard, the court was performing the time-honored function of a trial 
court in assessing the credibility and veracity of witnesses. In this case, the 
debtor’s witnesses won.191 The court found that “a risk premium of 1.5 and 2 
percent, respectively, for the two series of replacement notes is appropriate.”192 
The court did, however, change the base rate used.193 In In re Valenti, a Second 
Circuit case under chapter 13, the court had used the United States Treasury 
note rate as its base rate.194 As the court noted in Momentive, the Treasury note 
rate “is often used as a base rate for longer-term corporate debt such as the 
replacement notes.”195 There is a difference between the prime rate and the rate 
for Treasury notes: the Treasury rate is assumed to be riskless, while the prime 
rate has some risk built into it.  
As a result, the court thought that “there should be an additional amount 
added to the risk premium in light of the fact that the debtors used Treasury 
rates as the base rate.”196 The court added an additional increment of 0.5% for 
the first lien replacement notes, and an additional 0.75% for the 1.5 lien 
replacement notes.197 Given that the seven-year Treasury rate was 2.1%, the 
court thus assigned a reorganization discount rate of 4.1% and 4.85% for the 
reorganization notes.198 
The final rate contrasts with the then-prime rate of 3.25%, the exit 
financing rate of approximately 5% to 6%,199 and the fact that these rates were 
almost a third of the 11% WACC that Momentive’s own advisors had used in 
calculating reorganization value.200 Momentive would later estimate that these 
 
 190 Id. at *30. 
 191 Id. at *31. 
 192 Id. at *30. The court had noted that “the debt under the replacement notes is approximately 50 to 75 
percent less than the value of the collateral therefor, and closer to 50 percent than 75 percent. Gross debt 
leverage also will substantially decrease under the plan, from 17.8 percent to 5.6 percent, or from $4.4 billion 
in debt down to $1.3 billion.” Id. 
 193 Id. at *31–32.  
 194 105 F.3d 55, 64–65 (2d Cir. 1997).  
 195 Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at *32.  
 196 Id. 
 197 Id.  
 198 Id.  
 199 Id. at *34. 
 200 Momentive Performance Materials, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 148, at 51. 
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reorganization discount rates were approximately 87% of what market rates 
would have been.201 
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING A DISCOUNT RATE 
Any analysis of the application of Till’s formula rate in chapter 11 cases 
analysis must start with an examination and specification of the role and 
purpose of discount rates in cramdown. Creditors urge that 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) requires them to receive property that has a “value, as of 
the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder’s interest in 
the estate’s interest in such property.”202 They contend that the proper value is 
market value; their debt should be worth on the petition date what a third party 
would be willing to pay for it. Put another way, “the value of [the creditor’s] 
interest” in its collateral is the value the market ascribed to that note. If 
conceded, then the hunt for a discount rate the market would assign is very 
relevant. 
A. The Rejection of a Market Rate as Constituting Irrebuttable Evidence of a 
Proper Cramdown Interest Rate 
But doctrine and history belie this argument. Initially, the starting point is 
not § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). It is § 1129(b)(1). Paragraph (1) sets the standard 
for cramdown—that the plan be “fair and equitable” as to the dissenting class; 
the treatments listed in paragraph (2) are but examples of that treatment. As 
shown above,203 and as relevant to cramdown, there are three principles 
involved: “don’t pay too little”; “don’t pay too much”; and “don’t expect 
precision.” 
With respect to the minimum payment under the “fair and equitable” 
standard, the Supreme Court has been clear for almost seventy-five years that 
the standard is one of a “fair equivalent” exchange. That is, the property the 
plan offers offered must be the “fair equivalent” of the property surrendered; 
the reorganization debt received must be the fair equivalent of the pre-petition 
debt discharged. This much may not be objectionable at a high level of 
abstraction: who can argue against a “fair equivalent”? 
 
 201 Id. 
 202 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012). 
 203 See supra section II.B. 
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1. Evidence That Congress Does Not Always Adopt Market Rates in 
Reorganization 
What does rankle secured creditors is that “fair equivalents” under Till and 
its progeny may leave them with property they cannot sell for the amount of 
the debt discharged. This result was not unanticipated. When Congress adopted 
the 1978 Code, it left in place the “fair and equitable” standard. The 1973 
Commission explicitly decided to continue the standard,204 although it made 
the standard “more flexible.”205 As to the application of the “fair and 
equitable” standard to reorganizations, the Commission made no new 
suggestions. It merely acknowledged the problems this lack of precision in the 
term could cause: “‘Inequities are inevitable’ and any conception about ‘clear-
cut rules about legal priorities is an unrealistic one.’”206 
Indeed, the Code itself has several provisions that skew values in 
reorganization away from a market-based result. Section 1129(a)(7), for 
example, accepts the fact that a creditor with a debt bearing a below-market 
interest rate may receive less in reorganization than in liquidation.207 Section 
511 mandates an interest rate set by non-bankruptcy law for governmental 
entities.208 
These exceptions lead away from pure market results. As a more recent 
court has phrased it,  
[w]hile [the lender] is undoubtedly correct that no willing lender 
would have extended credit on the terms it was forced to accept under 
the § 1129(b) cramdown plan, this “absurd result” is the natural 
consequence of the prime-plus method, which sacrifices market 
realities in favor of simple and feasible bankruptcy 
reorganizations.209  
 
 204 THE COMM’N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2 
(1973). 
 205 Id. cmt. 6. 
 206 Id. pt. 1 (quoting Will, supra note 48, at 626). 
 207 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). The best interest test applies only to impaired creditors. Id. 
§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). If a creditor with a below market rate of interest is left unimpaired under § 1124, then the 
value of the property received will be less than they would have received in liquidation.  
 208 See id. § 511 (specifying that non-bankruptcy rates of interest should be used for certain types of 
claims held by governmental entities). 
 209 In re Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 324, 336 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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2. Protecting Restrictions on Potential Overpayment 
To put it in simple terms, the full and precise payment of secured creditors 
is a lesser value than the reorganization of a viable company—so long as the 
secured creditor receives the equitable equivalent of the value of its pre-
petition debt.210 
Why tolerate this less-than-full market-based compensation? It is a version 
of the “don’t pay too much” argument. Lower valuations of collateral (and of 
businesses) result in reduced or eliminated participation for junior interests.211 
If the lower valuation results from the use of a metric that factors in a 
bankruptcy taint, there is a policy position that such reduction or elimination is 
improper and unfair. As stated in In re New York, New Haven and Hartford 
R.R., “[t]he stigma of bankruptcy alone is a factor that will seriously depress 
the market value of a company’s securities.”212 After all, reorganization is 
supposed to result in a rescue based on future prospects; and the use of a 
tainted discount rate would then set the participation in that future venture at 
values at odds with the goal. 
On this point, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s recent chapter 11 study 
goes astray.213 The Commission’s Report recommended market-based interest 
 
 210 There is a relationship between risk factors under Till and the feasibility requirement of § 1129(a)(11). 
Paragraph (11) only requires that the court find it more likely than not that a plan is feasible; the risk factors 
contemplated by Till would seem to involve assessing success above the simple more likely-than-not stage. 
Accord Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 466 (2004); see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).  
 211 See In re 620 Church St. Corp., 299 U.S. 24, 27 (1936). 
 212 4 B.R. 758, 791 (D. Conn. 1980). The Third Circuit echoed this concern in In re Penn Central 
Transportation Co.:  
[The parties have argued that] the market can be expected irrationally to undervalue the securities 
of a once-distressed company emerging from a lengthy reorganization. In re Missouri Pac. R. R., 
39 F. Supp. 436, 446 (E.D.Mo.1941); See also Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate 
Reorganization, 17 U.Chi.L.Rev. 565, 566–69 (1950). That argument has considerable force 
when the securities in issue represent equity in, or long term interest bearing obligations of, a 
reorganized debtor. In such cases, the market value of the security will depend upon the investing 
public’s perception of the future prospects of the enterprise. That perception may well be unduly 
distorted by the recently concluded reorganization and the prospect of lean years for the 
enterprise in the immediate future. Use of a substitute “reorganization value” may under the 
circumstances be the only fair means of determining the value of the securities distributed. 
596 F.2d 1102, 1115–16 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 213 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 234–37 (2014). 
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rates be used in cramdown situations.214 Specifically, the Report stated that 
courts should look at many factors and reject a straight application of Till: 
In selecting the appropriate discount rate, the court should consider 
the evidence presented by the parties at the confirmation hearing and, 
if practicable, use the cost of capital for similar debt issued to 
companies comparable to the debtor as a reorganized entity, taking 
into account the size and creditworthiness of the debtor and the 
nature and condition of the collateral, among other factors. If such a 
market rate is not available or the court determines that an efficient 
market does not exist, the court should use an appropriate risk-
adjusted rate that reflects the actual risk posed in the case of the 
reorganized debtor, considering factors such as the debtor’s industry, 
projections, leverage, revised capital structure, and obligations under 
the plan. The court should not apply the “prime plus” formula 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 
465 (2004) in the chapter 11 context.215 
As stated in the Report, “[t]he objective is to make sure payments received 
by the secured creditor in the future represent the value of its secured claim on 
the effective date.”216 To achieve this goal, the Report further states that 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) should provide creditors with deferred cash payments that 
reflect economic realities. Section 1129(b)(2)(A), the Report contends,  
was intended to provide the secured creditor with the value of its 
allowed secured claim as of the effective date of the plan, even if that 
amount would be paid over an extended period of time. In other 
words, the secured creditor should receive the same return, regardless 
of whether the debtor elects to pay the allowed secured claim in cash 
on the effective date or through deferred cash payments over several 
years. Accordingly, the discount rate applied to the deferred cash 
payments should reflect the economic realities of the case, including 
the rate of interest available on similar debt and risks associated with 
the future income stream available to fund the payments.217 
This discussion is odd for several reasons. First, the Commission read 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) without any acknowledgment that it constitutes an example of 
the more general and controlling standard of “fair and equitable” as used in 
§ 1129(b)(1). Second, the Commission did not consider the history and 
doctrine of the “fair and equitable” doctrine, nor any discussion of any 
 
 214 Id. at 234–37. 
 215 Id. at 234. 
 216 Id. at 235. 
 217 Id. at 236–37. 
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Supreme Court decision before Till discussing the “fair and equitable” 
standard. Finally, there is no hint that valuation methods might be imprecise, 
and that this imprecision could hurt, as well as help, both debtors and creditors. 
In short, it is a one-sided discussion, focusing on what I have called the “don’t 
pay too little” question, while ignoring the “don’t pay too much” and “don’t 
expect precision” inquiries. 
Not surprisingly, the Commission rejected Till, but it is unclear exactly on 
what grounds. The Commission’s Report states that “the discount rate used in 
that prime plus formula is not based on the economic realities of the particular 
case. Consequently, this interpretation likely undercompensates creditors for 
the risk present in the post-confirmation credit.”218  
This statement is also odd in that it ignores legitimate interests of plan 
proponents by focusing solely on the creditor’s interest in compensation. By 
trying to ensure secured creditors receive “at least” the amount of their secured 
claim,219 the Commission’s Report fails to appreciate that anything over that 
amount, caused by errors in inputs or methodologies, is overcompensation that 
deprives participation for holders of junior interests. The Commission’s Report 
appears to believe that precise values can be placed on reorganization 
securities (or that any market for these new securities would reliably price 
them), thus ignoring my final apothegm, “don’t expect precision.” 
The Commission’s Report also does not address one of Judge Drain’s other 
concerns from Momentive. As he noted, rates for loans priced by the market 
have components not appropriate for a cramdown, such as initiation costs and 
profit components.220 Allowing valuations methodologies that include this 
component decreases valuation at the expense of junior creditors—a further 
example that would violate the general principle of “don’t pay too much.” 
 
 218 Id. at 237. 
 219 Id. at 234. 
 220 Judge Drain quoted In re Valenti in stating that cramdown is intended to “put the creditor in the same 
economic position it would have been in had it received the value of its allowed claim immediately . . . the 
value of a creditor’s allowed claim does not include any degree of profit. The purpose is not to put the creditor 
in the same position that it would have been in had it arranged a ‘new’ loan.” Momentive, No. 14-22503-rdd, 
2014 WL 4436335, at *25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-1771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015) (quoting 105 F.3d 55, 63–64 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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3. The Role of Precision and Expectations 
The rejection of a pure market-based method also borrows from the “don’t 
expect precision” argument. As the Supreme Court stated early on in Group of 
Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pacific R. R. Co.: 
“[W]hatever may be ‘the pretenses of exactitude’ in determining a dollar 
valuation for a railroad property, ‘to claim for it “scientific” validity, is to 
employ the term in its loosest sense.’”221 Indeed, some inaccuracy is to be 
expected. To be efficient, markets need information, and that relevant 
information may be scarce or conflicting in a chapter 11 case, either because of 
uncertainty over the legal issues involved,222 omnibus deals made that only 
incidentally affect the rationality of the discount rate,223 or just the mass of 
information disseminated in the chapter 11 case.224 
The history of valuation in bankruptcy supports the Supreme Court’s 
wariness. Courts have shifted among valuation methodologies over time, from 
capitalized earnings to discounted cash flow to beta analysis.225 Indeed, new 
methods may be on the horizon in terms of the use of credit derivatives.226 
Reducing or eliminating a stakeholder’s rights and participation on the basis of 
the latest product of financial wizardry may be unfair to those holding junior 
interests, especially when Congress has not specified any particular interest 
rate to be used, which it has done in other areas.227 
B. Not Irrebuttable, But Not Irrelevant Either 
Does this mean that market rates are irrelevant? The answer is no, but that 
answer has more to do with valuation procedure and how courts view valuation 
methodologies than anything else. Start first with the nature of the decision the 
bankruptcy court has to make. The statute requires the court to determine the 
 
 221 318 U.S. 523, 565 (1943) (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & Saint Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 
362, 370 (1940)). 
 222 In Momentive, in addition to the ultimate decisions on whether the inter-creditor agreements allowed 
Apollo to sponsor Momentive’s plan, the resolution of the issues of the validity of make whole premiums, and 
of the applicable discount rate were unknown before Judge Drain’s ruling. See Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, 
at *19–20. 
 223 Id. at *11. 
 224 See, e.g., In re N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 4 B.R. 758, 791 (D. Conn. 1980). 
 225 See generally Michael Simkovic, The Evolution of Valuation in Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2810622. 
 226 Id. at 5–6.  
 227 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 511 (2012) (specifying interest rate to be used in plan for certain types of debt 
owed to government entities). 
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present value of the reorganization debt, which will usually be the valuation of 
a promise. How is that done? As the Supreme Court determined, speaking 
through Justice Douglas: “Whether in a given case senior creditors have been 
made whole or received ‘full compensatory treatment’ rests in the informed 
judgment of the [the trier of facts] on consideration of all relevant facts.”228 
Does this mean that the selection of an appropriate discount rate is an issue of 
fact or an issue of law?229 
The characterization matters. If an issue of fact, then the bankruptcy court 
could be reversed only if the selection of a particular method of valuation was 
clearly erroneous. This could happen, for example, if the bankruptcy court 
spurned the use of future earnings in conducting its valuation and focused only 
on past offers to buy the business.230 If an issue of law, however, then a de 
novo standard of review applies, with the appellate court in a position to 
choose the appropriate valuation method. 
Courts are somewhat conflicted over the appropriate characterization.231 As 
recently stated in Alberts v. HCA, Inc., however, the authorities “stating that a 
bankruptcy court’s valuation determinations are issues of fact” are in fact 
“more persuasive and appear to represent the majority view.”232 If followed, 
this characterization gives bankruptcy courts, as the initial trier of fact, great 
latitude to adopt and adapt valuation methodologies—so long as they adhere to 
the general guidelines that they must look to the future, not to the past. 
Might a bankruptcy court consider market rates in its determination of an 
appropriate discount rate? The answer is yes, if done cautiously. If the rates 
 
 228 Grp. Of Inst. Inv’rs v. Chi., Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 565 (1943). 
 229 For an excellent article that touches on many of this issues in this section, see Anthony J. Casey & 
Julia Simon-Kerr, A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1175 (2015). 
 230 See, e.g., Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 
414, 442 n.20 (1968) (reversing the lower court because it had not looked to future earnings in an absolute 
priority valuation). 
 231 Cases favoring a clearly erroneous standard include: Alberts v. HCA, Inc., 496 B.R. 1, 14 n.6 (D.D.C. 
2013); Estate of Godley v. Comm’r, 286 F.3d 210, 212 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding valuation methodology is “part 
of the larger factual question of valuation” and this issue is reviewed for clear error); Gross v. Comm’r, 272 
F.3d 333, 343 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The choice of the appropriate valuation methodology for a particular stock is, 
in itself, a question of fact.”) (citations omitted); Sammons v. Comm’r, 838 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(determining whether the Tax Court appropriately selected cost method of valuing art collection is question of 
fact reviewed for clear error). Cases favoring a de novo standard include: McGarey v. Midfirst Bank (In re 
McGarey), 529 B.R. 277, 282 (D. Ariz. 2015); Nat’l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin. Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power 
Ass’n, 111 B.R. 752, 767 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990) (“The bankruptcy court’s selection and application of 
valuation methodology is primarily a legal matter.”). 
 232 496 B.R. at 13. 
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found in the market are shown to be sufficiently reflective of the risks inherent 
in the plan of reorganization, then market rates may influence the increase to 
the risk-free rate used in Till.233 Judge Drain recognized this point: “[M]arket-
based evidence should not be considered, except, arguably and, if so 
secondarily, when setting a proper risk premium in the formula approach taken 
by Till and Valenti.”234 
This point is underscored by the statutory analysis employed in Till. In 
footnote 14, the Supreme Court provided a very short and cryptic dicta when 
interpreting what the appropriate discount rate might be: “[I]t might make 
sense to ask what rate an efficient market would produce.”235 
This approach makes prosecuting and proving cramdown cases perilous for 
lawyers. It means that value, and the discount rate used to obtain value, are 
factual matters subject to a deferential standard of review. But given the 
history of the “fair and equitable” rule, the goal of this inquiry is not to reach a 
“conclusion [that] correspond[s] to the valuation that the relevant community 
believes to be accurate”236 Rather, the goal is to make  
a prediction as to what will occur in the future, an estimate, as 
distinguished from mathematical certitude. . . . But that estimate must 
be based on an informed judgment which embraces all facts relevant 
to future earning capacity and hence to present worth, including, of 
course, the nature and condition of the properties, the past earnings 
record, and all circumstances which indicate whether or not that 
record is a reliable criterion of future performance.237  
As the Third Circuit noted: 
[T]he market can be expected irrationally to undervalue the securities 
of a once-distressed company emerging from a lengthy 
reorganization. . . . That argument has considerable force when the 
securities in issue represent equity in, or long term interest bearing 
obligations of, a reorganized debtor. . . . In such cases, the market 
value of the security will depend upon the investing public’s 
 
 233 Casey & Simon-Kerr, supra note 229, at 1206 (“[W]hat judges are required and competent to do, in 
addition to excluding unqualified experts, is to question the assumptions that the experts make, to insist that 
experts persuade them that theirs is the best methodology, to be meticulous in questioning the pieces that make 
up that methodology, and to enforce the burden of proof.”).  
 234 Momentive, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335, at *26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R. 321 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015) (emphasis added). 
 235 Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 476 n.14 (2004). 
 236 Casey & Simon-Kerr, supra note 229, at 1206. 
 237 Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941). 
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perception of the future prospects of the enterprise. That perception 
may well be unduly distorted by the recently concluded 
reorganization and the prospect of lean years for the enterprise in the 
immediate future. Use of a substitute “reorganization value” may 
under the circumstances be the only fair means of determining the 
value of the securities distributed.238 
This policy of excising components of bankruptcy “taint” raises the stakes 
in “getting it right” at confirmation, and underscores the need for persuasive 
presentation of valuation evidence. Tied up in this analysis are two 
propositions: (1) “value” in § 1129(b)(2) can encompass a formula-based 
approach; and (2) determining the components of the formula need not turn a 
blind eye to market evidence to the extent that such evidence bears on the 
formula’s risk factors (or to the extent that some other method of valuation 
exists that does not penalize the debtor for its status and focuses on future cash 
flow). Given the wide scope of “relevance” under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence,239 this policy opens a wide door for market-based evidence. What it 
does not do, however, is change the formula into which such evidence is 
inserted. 
CONCLUSION 
I began with the assertion that valuation in reorganization is messy. This 
untidiness is exemplified by the process of selecting an appropriate discount 
rate to use to value a stream of payments under a plan of reorganization, and 
by the lack of indisputably accurate valuations. There is a natural tendency to 
factor in that the debtor, as the obligor on such payments, has already broken 
all its previous promises.  
To counteract this gloomy perspective, reorganization doctrine and policy 
have always indicated that intrinsic value, not market-based prices, should 
have primacy in determining the value of a debtor or reorganization debt. But 
the inputs necessary to produce intrinsic value are flexible; a bankruptcy court 
can admit any evidence that tends to make a valuation opinion more or less 
likely. Thus, valuation can and usually is shown by whatever forward-looking 
relevant evidence can be adduced. 
 
 238 In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 596 F.2d 1102, 1115–16 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing In re Mo. Pac. R.R., 39 F. 
Supp. 436, 446 (E.D. Mo. 1941)). Accord Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate 
Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 565, 566–69 (1950)). 
 239 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, a fact is relevant if it is of consequence, and if it has “any 
tendency to make a fact more or less probable.” FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added). 
MARKELL GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/15/2016 3:05 PM 
2016] FAIR EQUIVALENTS AND MARKET PRICES 139 
There are, of course, limitations. Through a series of cases decided soon 
after the adoption of the current “fair and equitable” standard, the Supreme 
Court indicated a broad preference for evidence of future earning capacity over 
past values, for “fair equivalents” of value rather than mathematically precise 
determinations. This process is designed to produce property the value of 
which is the “fair equivalent” of the debt discharged in the reorganization, an 
exhortation to not pay too little to creditors.  
At the same time, courts have indicated that the valuation evidence adduced 
needs to be stripped of components related to the taint of past failures; 
valuations are to be based upon reasonable future prospects, not on past or 
perceived present failures. This protects junior creditors and is an embodiment 
of the “don’t pay too much” concept. 
Against this background, Till’s formula-based approach provides a rough 
and ready “fair equivalent” of value as Consolidated Rock and its progeny 
require. The use of the Till formula is devoid of reliance on factors 
incorporating the debtor’s past errors and does not treat the debtor as riskier 
just because of its bankruptcy filing.  
Market-based rates, in contrast, inevitably incorporate elements that history 
and doctrine have tried to scrub from the reorganization process. They also 
imbue their results with far more precision than the facts in most 
reorganizations can justify, or the policy behind reorganization can tolerate. 
Until valuation practice produces better methodologies that fit within the 
boundaries of the “fair and equitable” standard set early on by the Supreme 
Court, or until Congress changes confirmation standards, Till’s formula-based 
discount rates will be unassailable in chapter 11. 
 
